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I. INTRODUCTION
The global economic crisis brought credit default swaps (CDSs) out
of the shadows of Wall Street and into the public consciousness.1  As
journalists and academics try to make sense of the economic down-
turn, CDSs figure prominently in their narratives.2  Politicians and
regulators have taken aim at these complex and, what are perceived
1. See Sue Kirchhoff & Barbara Hagenbaugh, Credit Market Has Pros Confused,
USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2007-08-
27-econ-survey_N.htm (reporting the results of a 2007 survey of economists and
professionals by the National Association for Business Economics, which found
that “68% [of those surveyed] didn’t have a handle on credit default swaps”);
Gretchen Morgenson, Arcane Market Is Next to Face Big Credit Test, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/business/17swap.html (“Few
Americans have heard of credit default swaps . . . .  But if the economy keeps
slowing, credit default swaps, like subprime mortgages, may become a household
term.”).
2. See Andrew Leonard, The Credit Swap Credibility Gap, SALON (Dec. 19, 2007),
http://www.salon.com/technology/how_the_world_works/2007/12/19/junk_bond_
insurers (calling credit default swaps “everybody’s favorite credit derivative”); Ja-
net Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?, TIME, Mar. 17, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html (“Credit de-
fault swaps . . . could soon become the eye of the credit hurricane.”); Heather
Timmons, The Year That Made Deal Makers Giddy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/05/business/05deal.html (noting the role of
credit default swaps in creating a record breaking number of mergers and acqui-
sitions in 2006).
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as, largely speculative financial plays, believing that this speculation
was a major factor contributing to the global economic downturn.3  As
a result, uncovered credit default swaps—and naked short selling—
are frequently the target of regulators crafting prophylactic regula-
tions designed to prevent future crises.4
The U.S. has taken the lead on financial reform, including regula-
tion of CDSs.  The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act,5 signed into law by President Obama on July 21,
2010,6 includes a nascent framework for comprehensive regulation of
credit default swaps.7  This groundbreaking legislation not only signif-
icantly changes how CDSs and swaps generally are transacted and
regulated, but it also mandates further study of the complex market
forces responsible for the global economic downturn that are yet to be
fully understood.8  This Article responds to the legislative call and ex-
amines if the Dodd–Frank legislation went far enough in regulating
CDSs by examining alternative approaches for regulating CDSs being
considered by our European counterparts.9
3. See Huw Jones & Krista Hughes, EU to Discuss Credit Default Swap Specula-
tion, Watchdog Frets, REUTERS, Mar. 8, 2010, available at http://blogs.reuters.com
/financial-regulatory-forum/2010/03/08/eu-to-discuss-credit-default-swap-specula
tion-watchdog-frets/ (reporting that EU finance ministers were meeting to con-
sider how to “dampen speculation on sovereign credit default swap markets”);
Dina Kyriakidou, Greek PM Says Economic Crisis Confirmed Worst Fears,
REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE
61P0ZO20100226.  Speaking to the Hellenic Parliament, Greek Prime Minister
George Papandreou summarized the government’s position: “There is only one
dilemma: Will we let the country go bankrupt or will we react?  Will we let the
speculators strangle us, or will we take our fate in our own hands?” Id.
4. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Congresswoman Maxine Waters, Congresswoman
Waters Introduces Credit Default Swap Prohibition Act (July 10, 2009), available
at http://www.waters.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=
140685 (“Preventing all credit default swaps is essential to bringing stability to
the market and preventing a similar crisis in the future. . . .  Unless credit default
swaps are banned entirely, I am concerned that the industry will find a way to
loosen standards and widen exemptions for customized contracts and then we
will be right back to where we are today, with capital markets hobbled and the
financial system in need of additional government intervention.”).
5. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
6. See Jesse Lee, President Obama Signs Wall Street Reform: “No Easy Task,”
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 21, 2010, 2:22 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
2010/07/21/president-obama-signs-wall-street-reform-no-easy-task.
7. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 701–814,
124 Stat. at 1641–822.
8. See id. § 719, 124 Stat. at 1654.
9. The Article touches on naked short selling, which is also the subject of a
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act mandated study.
Although the focus of this Article is on regulation of CDSs, because naked short
selling and uncovered CDSs are often equated, much of the analysis here is rele-
vant to a discussion of naked short selling.
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As part of the global financial marketplace, credit default swaps—
with a global marketplace worth an estimated $60 trillion10—have
undoubtedly played a role in the recent financial crisis.11  For in-
stance, insurance giant AIG figured prominently in the collapse and
subsequent government bailout, having written hundreds of billions
in CDS protection.12  When the economy took a dive as the sub-prime
mortgage debacle kicked off, AIG was increasingly stretched thin as
demands on its capital threatened to topple the company.13  In turn, a
meltdown at AIG threatened to begin a domino collapse of banks and
hedge funds, all dependent on AIG for protection in the event that the
economy took a turn for the worse.14  The Federal Reserve (Fed) even-
tually stepped in, providing a $182 billion bailout15 to keep the in-
surer afloat and stave off a broader economic collapse.16  The Fed’s
rescue effort sparked a public outrage,17 which soon turned from the
recipient of the bailout to the financial instruments which precipitated
its fall.18
10. Bryan J. Orticelli, Crisis Compounded by Constraint: How Regulatory Inadequa-
cies Impaired the Fed’s Bailout of Bear Stearns, 42 CONN. L. REV. 647, 657 (2009).
11. See id.; Geithner Expects Bailout Program to End Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/business/economy/03derivatives.html;
Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since ‘30s, with No End Yet in Sight, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122169431617549947.html.
12. See Serena Ng & Thomas Catan, We Were ‘Prudent’: AIG Man at Center of Crisis,
WALL ST. J., July 1, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870342
6004575338640175139822.html (“In 2007 and 2008, banks called for collateral
from AIG when the mortgage assets fell in value.  Those collateral calls eventu-
ally overwhelmed the company and led to its near collapse.”).
13. See id.
14. See Lydie N.C. Pierre-Louis, Hedge Fund Fraud and the Public Good, 15 FORD-
HAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 21, 90 (2009); Lilla Zuill & Kristina Cooke, AIG Failure
Would Still Be Disastrous for Global Markets, REUTERS, Mar. 2, 2009, available
at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/03/02/uk-aig-bailout-sb-idUKTRE5211EW2
0090302.
15. John Martinez, Getting Back the Public’s Money: The Anti-Favoritism Norm in
American Property Law, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 619, 622–23 (2010).
16. See Mark Labaton, Swap Meet, L.A. LAWYER, Oct. 2009, at 24, 27; Ng & Catan,
supra note 12.
17. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Constituents Make Their Bailout Views Known,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/business/
25voices.html.
18. See Duh, Hedge Funds Bought AIG Credit Default Swaps Too, NAKED CAPITAL-
ISM (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/03/duh-hedge-funds-
bought-aig-credit.html (“If the public were to take offense at the idea of govern-
ment money rewarding successful speculators, it might lead to restrictions on
CDS writing in cases where the protection buyer did not own and continue to hold
assets of the reference entity. One can only hope.”); U.S. Sen. Grassley: The Fi-
nancial Bailout, IOWAPOLITICS.COM (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.iowapolitics.com/
index.iml?Article=205706 (decrying the diffusion of AIG bailout funds to CDS
counterparties).  In a Q&A style explanation of the bailout, U.S. Senator Charles
Grassley of Iowa stated:
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Interest in the role of CDSs in the financial crisis peaked again in
early 2010, when the Greek government faced certain collapse,19 lead-
ing to an EU–IMF bailout.20  Perhaps influenced by events in the
U.S., the Greek government was quick to blame speculators for its fi-
nancial woes—particularly speculators purchasing CDSs on Greek
sovereign debt.21  In Athens’s view, CDSs intensified and hastened
events leading to its financial instability and necessitating an EU
bailout.22
Some commentators and industry insiders claim that speculators,
and innovative finance in general, are just scapegoats in the regula-
tors’ quest to pin the blame for the financial catastrophe on a sector
that is little understood and even distrusted by the public at large.23
They say that governments seek to blame speculators at every finan-
cial crisis rather than take responsibility for their part in making the
crisis.24  Others claim that speculators in derivatives like CDSs are
little more than gamblers, contributing nothing to the “real econ-
omy.”25  These commentators link CDSs with activities—like gam-
So, the public bailed out AIG, and the money flowed through AIG to a
few large banks, including Goldman Sachs.  Now we know that the
money kept flowing through Goldman to financial institutions and oper-
ations all over the world.  It’s as if the New York Fed used AIG as a front
man for the bailout of the other firms.
Id.
19. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Trades in Greek Debt Add to Country’s
Financing Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/
25/business/global/25swaps.html; Jason Simpkins, Credit Default Swaps Strike
Again—This Time Driving Greece to the Brink of Default, MONEY MORNING (Feb.
26, 2010), http://moneymorning.com/2010/02/26/credit-default-swaps-7/.
20. See Judy Dempsey & Jack Ewing, Germany Approves Assistance for Greece,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/global/
04ecb.html.
21. See Kyriakidou, supra note 3.
22. See Schwartz & Dash, supra note 19.
23. See J. Scott Colesanti, Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts: Testing the Populist View of
the Causes of the Economic Crisis, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 175, 175
(2010) (“[T]he lingering economic crisis has drawn much attention to individual
products and private sector villains thought to have caused the market
meltdown.”).
24. See id. at 176 (listing the scapegoats of previous economic downturns); Nelson D.
Schwartz, Those Wall Street Gamblers Might Not Be Bad After All, N.Y.
TIMES. Mar. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/weekinreview/21
schwartz.html; Blame the Speculators, ECONOMIST BLOGS (June 8, 2010, 17:24),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/06/capital_controls.
25. See Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Cent. Bank, Lecture at the
Universidade Nova de Lisboa: What Role for Finance? (May 6, 2010), available at
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100506.en.html (arguing that,
when decoupled from the real economy, finance introduces a moral hazard into
the economy that incentivizes market manipulation).  In addition to incentivizing
fraudulent market manipulation, uncovered CDS transactions introduce market
distortion by directly and inappropriately depressing the price of the underlying
assets. See id.
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bling—that carry a degree of social stigma,26 and they associate CDSs
with fraudulent investment practices like Ponzi schemes.27  Beyond
simple name calling, speculators are accused of distorting the underly-
ing market and even of using CDSs to manipulate the market to their
profit by taking steps to sink companies and governments.28
Responding to these losses and public outrage over “Wall Street
[e]xcesses,”29 numerous proposals to regulate CDSs have emerged.  A
theme running through much of this commentary is the analogy be-
tween CDSs and insurance policies.30  Like a casualty or life insur-
ance policy, a CDS makes a payout to its purchaser on the occurrence
of a loss event.31  In the case of a life insurance policy, the loss event is
the death of the insured.32  Under a CDS contract, the loss event—
called a “credit event”—is generally a company or government’s de-
26. See Nicholas Varchaver & Katie Benner, The $55 Trillion Question, FORTUNE
(Sep. 30, 2008, 12:28 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/30/magazines/fortune/
varchaver_derivatives_short.fortune/index.htm (“[C]redit default swaps became
the world’s largest casino.”); Press Release, U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders, Sum-
mary of the Wall Street Reform Bill (July 15, 2010), http://sanders.senate.gov/
newsroom/news/?id=d6acf243-839f-4c62-adc2-b2f0c0d189ab (“[The Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act] does not do enough to stop too
big to fail banks from gambling trillions of dollars in risky derivatives and credit
default swaps.”).  According to Senator Sanders, credit default swaps “led to the
$182 billion bailout of AIG, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the downfall of Bear
Stearns and precipitated the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.”
Id.
27. See, e.g., Mary Childs, Credit-Default Swap Index in U.S. Increases on Economic
Data, Greek Bonds, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2010, 4:33 PM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2010-10-27/credit-default-swaps-index-in-u-s-climbs-as-yields-on-greek
-bonds-soar.html.
28. See Vikas Bajaj, Joint U.S.–New York Inquiry Into Credit-Default Swaps, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/20/business/20swaps.html
(discussing an investigation into whether credit default swaps were used to ma-
nipulate the price of shares in some banks during the crisis); Floyd Norris, Out
of the Shadows and Into the Harsh Light, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 26, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/business/27charts.html (quoting SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox who stated that the CDS market is “ripe for fraud and
manipulation”).
29. Blake Allison, Letter to the Editor, Invisible Hand Should Restrain Wall Street
Excesses, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:
SB123458359567687341.html.
30. See Letter from the Nat’l Conference of Ins. Legislators to the Chair of the
House–Senate Fin. Reform Conference Comm., Congressman Barney Frank
(June 15, 2010), http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/2010/07152010CDSLetter.pdf
(describing the National Conference of Insurance Legislators’ recently drafted
Credit Default Insurance Model Legislation and suggesting that CDSs should be
regulated as insurance).
31. See MOORAD CHOUDHRY, THE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP BASIS 2 (2006).
32. See PAMELA PETERSON DRAKE & FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE BASICS OF FINANCE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL MARKETS, BUSINESS FINANCE, AND PORTFOLIO MAN-
AGEMENT 47 (2010).
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fault on its bond obligations.33  Insurance provides an easy analog for
credit derivatives like CDSs, and insurance provides ready infrastruc-
ture and a regulatory blueprint for CDS regulation.34
This line of proposals suggests that, like an insurance policy, a
CDS should not be issued without the purchaser having an insurable
interest in the “property” insured by the policy—i.e. the CDS’s refer-
ence obligation.  Imposition of an insurable interest requirement on
CDSs would prohibit an investor from purchasing CDS protection un-
less the investor also owns an asset on which the CDS is written.35
The analogy between insurance and CDSs has many proponents
because the contracts are similar, in that both types of contracts pro-
tect the purchaser from risk, transferring it to another party.36  How-
ever, we must examine the contractual difference between a
traditional insurance policy and a CDS and the sphere of influence of
each type of contract before accepting insurance regulation as a map
for regulation of CDSs.
Supplementing the comparison between CDSs and insurance poli-
cies, CDSs are often condemned in the same breath as naked short
selling,37 which has been the subject of increasingly strict federal (and
worldwide) regulation in the past decade.38  Similar to insurance, na-
ked short selling provides a ready analogue to credit derivatives like
CDSs.  Like the analogy with insurance, the analogy between CDSs
and financial transactions such as short selling has a certain intuitive
appeal and yields valuable insight into the problems presented by
CDSs.
The U.S. legislative effort directed at CDSs has shifted away from
an insurance based approach, focusing instead on increasing trans-
parency in the CDS markets.39  Although officials of the European
33. See ANDREW CHISHOLM, DERIVATIVES DEMYSTIFIED: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO
FORWARDS, FUTURES, SWAPS AND OPTIONS 75 (2d ed. 2010); CHOUDHRY, supra note
31.
34. The New York State Insurance Department was poised to regulate CDSs as in-
surance products in 2008 but abruptly changed its stance. See discussion infra
section VI.C.
35. See George Soros, Op-Ed., One Way to Stop Bear Raids, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB123785310594719693.html.
36. See ROBERT EYLER, MONEY AND BANKING: AN INTERNATIONAL TEXT 59 (2009).
37. See, e.g., Wolfgang Mu¨nchau, Editorial, Time to Outlaw Naked Credit Default
Swaps, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7b56f5b2-24a3-11df-
8be0-00144feab49a.html (arguing that naked credit default swaps are “purely
speculative gamble[s]”).
38. See Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 50103, 69 Fed. Reg. 48008, 48009 n.10
(Aug. 6, 2004); Judy Dempsey & David Jolly, Germany Acts Alone to Protect the
Euro and Big Banks Against Speculators, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/05/20/business/global/20short.html.
39. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 701–814, 124 Stat. 1376, 1644–1822 (2010).
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Union have yet to finalize comprehensive financial reform, having is-
sued only a limited set of proposed rules on naked short selling and
uncovered CDSs at the time this Article went to press,40 the proposed
rules have developed under the paradigm of an insurance-based regu-
latory model.41
This Article examines the measured regulatory approach taken by
the U.S. Government, which focuses on introducing transparency into
the CDS market, and contrasts it with the insurance-based regulatory
approach considered by the European Commission,42 EU member
states,43 and the State of New York.44  This Article also concludes that
an outright ban or the imposition of an insurable interest requirement
on CDSs would be counterproductive to the intended policy objective.
Finally, this Article calls for more enforced transparency regarding
swap markets.
II. OVERVIEW OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
A. Introduction
A single-name credit default swap45 (CDS) is a bilateral contract
under which a protection seller promises to make good on the protec-
tion buyer’s losses in the event that the entity (i.e., the reference en-
tity) that issued the CDS’s underlying bond defaults on its debt
obligations prior to maturity of the CDS.46  In exchange, the buyer
promises to make a series of payments (i.e., premiums) to the protec-
tion seller.47
A CDS’s reference entity may be a bond issuing corporation or gov-
ernment.48  Premiums are typically paid on a quarterly or annual
basis.49
40. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Short
Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, COM (2010) 482 final (Sept.
9, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/short_
selling/20100915_proposal_en.pdf [hereinafter EC Proposed Regulation].
41. See, e.g., EU Parliament Votes to Ban CDS Speculation, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS-
WEEK (Mar. 7, 2011, 3:06 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/
D9LQJLCG0.htm (noting that a regulation approved by the European Parlia-
ment would prohibit investors from purchasing “insurance on government debt if
they don’t own the underlying bond”).
42. See EC Proposed Regulation, supra note 40.
43. See Dempsey & Jolly, supra note 38.
44. See discussion infra section VI.C.
45. In addition to single-name CDSs, CDS indexes, multi-name CDSs, and more com-
plex variations on the CDS exist.
46. CHOUDHRY, supra note 31, at 8–9.
47. See id. at 8.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id. at 9.
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Upon default, either physical or cash settlement of the CDS will
take place.50  In a physical settlement, the buyer delivers the refer-
ence assets to the seller, who makes the protection payoff, which is
equal to the reference asset’s par value.51  In a cash settlement, the
protection payoff will be equal to the notional amount of the CDS less
the market value of the reference assets after default.52  A CDS is sim-
ilar to a term life insurance contract in that the protection seller (i.e.,
insurer) will not make a protection payoff to the protection purchaser
(i.e., insured) unless a default event occurs.53
Generally, a CDS’s credit event will be the reference entity’s bank-
ruptcy, obligation acceleration, obligation default, failure to pay, repu-
diation of or moratorium on its debt, or restructuring.54  However, the
triggering “credit event” may also be another occurrence that is nego-
tiated between the CDS parties.  For example, AIG wrote CDSs on
mortgage securities issued by Goldman Sachs.55  Under some of those
CDSs, AIG was required to make payments to Goldman if the value of
the mortgage assets making up the security decreased in value by 4%
or more.56
In addition to provisions requiring a payout on a CDS if a credit
event occurs, CDS contracts also frequently require the protection
seller to collateralize its obligation under the contract.57  Collateral
may be required of a protection seller based on a decrease in the value
of the CDS’s reference assets or the protection seller’s
creditworthiness.58
In addition to allowing purchasers to hedge against potential
losses on debt obligations, CDSs also permit investors to trade in risk.
An investor who believes that an entity is at risk for default may
purchase protection on that reference entity’s debt—even if the inves-
tor does not have an interest in the CDS’s reference obligation.59  Sim-
ilarly, an investor who believes that a reference entity is stable and
50. Id.
51. See EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & JOEL F. HOUSTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL MAN-
AGEMENT 210 (11th ed. 2007).  “Par value” refers to a bond’s face value, which is
typically the price at which the bond is sold on issuance. Id.
52. CHOUDHRY, supra note 31, at 22.
53. See id. at 22–23.
54. See Christian Weistoffer, Credit Default Swaps: Heading Towards a More Stable
System, DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.dbresearch.com/
PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000252032.pdf.
55. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Testy Conflict with Goldman Helped Push
A.I.G. to Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07/
business/07goldman.html.
56. See id.
57. CHOUDHRY, supra note 31, at 69–71.
58. See id.
59. See JAN JOB DE VRIES ROBBE´ & PAUL U. ALI, SECURITISATION OF DERIVATIVES AND
ALTERNATIVE ASSET CLASSES: YEARBOOK 2005, at 94–95 (2005).
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unlikely to default on its debt may sell protection and receive a stream
of fixed payments (i.e., premiums).60  CDSs may also be used to create
“synthetic bonds.”61  If, for example, an investor wants exposure to
$50 million in GE debt, but cannot locate $50 million in GE bonds, the
investor can mimic exposure to $50 million in GE bonds by selling pro-
tection on GE.
B. Secondary Market for CDSs
After a CDS is written either counterparty may sell their rights
and duties under the CDS on the secondary market.62  The secondary
market for CDSs emerged because a CDS’s spread changes over
time.63  The spread on a particular CDS is determined at issuance,
but events transpiring after issuance often affect the creditworthiness
of the reference entity.64  If the reference entity’s debt is riskier after
issuance, later-issued CDSs will have a higher spread, resulting in
higher premium payments compared with earlier issued CDSs.65  This
increases the value of the first CDS to protection purchasers, because
premium payments on the earlier issued CDSs will be lower than
those of later issued CDSs, and this decreases its value for protection
sellers, who can get higher rates by issuing new CDSs.66  In contrast,
if conditions for the reference entity improve rather than deteriorate
after issuance of a CDS, later-issued CDSs will have lower spreads,
increasing the value of the first CDS for protection sellers and de-
creasing its value for protection purchasers who can enter a new CDS
contract at a lower spread.67
A protection seller who wants to divest himself of his rights and
responsibilities under the CDS will sell his rights under the contract
(i.e., the right to receive fixed premium payments over time) and
transfer his duties under the contract (i.e., the duty to make a payout
if a specified credit event occurs) to a third party purchaser.68  Like-
wise, a protection purchasers who can sell his rights under the con-
tract (i.e., the right to a payout under the CDS if a specified credit
event occurs) and transfer his duties under the contract (i.e., the duty
to make periodic premium payments) to a third party purchaser.69
60. Id.
61. CHOUDHRY, supra note 31, at 59–60.
62. See MOORAD CHOUDHRY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES 63 (2004).
63. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 31, at 9–13.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 38–45.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 9–10.
69. See id.
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The original parties to the CDS must agree to the transfer, substitut-
ing the parties through novation.70
C. Options and CDSs—Leverage to Build or Bury
As mentioned earlier in this section, a CDS is similar to an insur-
ance policy, resulting in a payout if a credit event (e.g., a reference
entity default) occurs.71  A CDS can also be analogized to a stock op-
tion.  A stock option gives the purchaser the right either to buy or sell
a specified quantity of a security at a set price—the option’s strike
price.72  Like an option’s strike price, a CDS’s definition of “credit
event” will determine whether the CDS is profitable for parties to the
contract.
One of the appealing attributes of both CDSs and stock options is
the leverage both afford to investors.  Stock options leverage the par-
ties’ gains and losses by giving them virtual control over a significant
number of shares without requiring the purchaser to own those
shares.73  Thus, for instance, an investor who purchases or sells 100
stock options effectively controls, and realizes profits or losses on, 100
shares of stock without purchasing or borrowing those shares.  Simi-
larly, a person who sells $10 million in CDS protection on Corporation
ABC will realize similar profits and losses and is exposed to approxi-
mately the same risk as a person who purchases $10 million in Corpo-
ration ABC’s bonds.  If ABC does not default on its bond, the
protection seller will have received premiums from the protection pur-
chaser that are roughly the same as the interest payments paid to the
person who purchased ABC bond.  Likewise, if ABC defaults on its
bond, the person who purchased the bonds outright and the person
who sold CDS protection on ABC will realize roughly equivalent
losses.  Note that, although the protection seller is in roughly the
same financial position as the purchaser of the bonds, the protection
seller did not purchase the bonds and did not expend $10 million to
purchase the bond.  Aside from any transaction costs and collateral
requirements in the CDS contract, the protection seller is effectively
exposed to $10 million in ABC bonds without the bond purchaser’s $10
million capital expense.
CDSs and options thus function similarly, providing investors with
significant leverage that can multiply profits and losses.74  As we’ll
discuss in the next section, the leverage provided by CDSs played two
70. See JAN JOB DE VRIES ROBBE´, SECURITIZATION LAW AND PRACTICE: IN THE FACE OF
THE CREDIT CRUNCH 174 (2008).
71. CHOUDHRY, supra note 31, at 2, 66.
72. JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 5–6 (4th ed. 2000).
73. MICHAEL C. THOMSETT, THE OPTIONS TRADING BODY OF KNOWLEDGE: THE DEFINI-
TIVE SOURCE FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE OPTIONS INDUSTRY 33–34 (2010).
74. Id.
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potential roles in the financial crisis.  First, the leverage inherent in
CDSs has been blamed for allowing speculators to manipulate the
market for Greek sovereign debt, destroying Greece’s ability to fund
its government.  Second, CDSs allowed AIG, a U.S. insurance com-
pany, to lever itself into an untenable financial position that unrav-
eled as housing prices plummeted with the subprime mortgage crisis
that erupted in 2007 and 2008.
III. THE ROLE OF CDSs IN THE AIG & GREEK CRISES
A. The Greek Debt Crisis and Bailout
In early 2010, a number of European governments—including
Greece, Portugal, and Spain—began showing signs of imminent finan-
cial collapse.75  With C= 300 billion in debt—a figure bigger than its
entire gross domestic output—and deficits of 12.7%, Greece has occu-
pied the spotlight from the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis.76
Further, as the Greek crisis began to unfold in February 2010, net
short positions—including short sales and CDSs—in Greek debt in-
creased.77  Speculators taking these short positions were blamed by
the Greek government for exacerbating the Greek government’s finan-
cial slide by decreasing investor confidence in Greek sovereign debt.78
At the core of the Greek crisis is its national debt.  The Greek gov-
ernment relies heavily on foreign borrowing to fund its extensive so-
cial programs.79  When the global recession hit, tax revenues—
already shallow because of rampant tax evasion—fell to new lows,
forcing additional borrowing.80  Investors, growing leery of Greece’s
financial stability, began demanding higher yields on government
bonds, significantly increasing Greece’s cost of borrowing.81  Yields on
75. See Landon Thomas Jr. & Nicholas Kulish, I.M.F. Promises More Aid for Greece
as European Crisis Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/04/29/business/global/29euro.html.
76. See Rachel Donadio, Greek Leader Offers Plan to Tackle Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/world/europe/15greece.html.
77. See Peter Garnham et al., Traders Make $8bn Bet Against Euro, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
8, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/00330ba78-149f-11df-9ea1-00144feab49a.html.
78. See Steven Erlanger & Matthew Saltmarsh, Greek Debt Crisis Raises Doubts
About the European Union, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/05/08/world/europe/08europe.html.
79. See Landon Thomas Jr., Patchwork Pension Plan Adds to Greek Debt Woes, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/business/global/12
pension.html.
80. See Dan Roberts, Greek Debt Crisis: How Did the Greek Economy Get Into Such a
Mess?, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (May 6, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/
may/06/greek-debt-crisis-economy.
81. Wanfeng Zhou, See Euro Falls Broadly as Greek Debt Worries Escalate, REUTERS,
Apr. 21, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/21/markets-
forex-idUSN2119764420100421.
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two-year bonds rose as high as 38% at the end of April 2010, surpass-
ing the interest rate on many consumer credit cards.82
As Greece’s cost of borrowing increased, its borrowing capacity di-
minished, threatening the Greek government’s ability to repay its
debts and fund its social programs.83  When the Greek Parliament
was forced to cut spending in March 2010, riots broke out in the
capital.84
The final component of the Greek debt crisis—forcing the EU to
take immediate action to stave off collapse—was the April 2010 down-
grading of Greek sovereign debt to junk status, the lowest credit rat-
ing in the Eurozone.85  This downgrade not only increased Greece’s
cost of borrowing but also increased interest rates on its old debt and
resulted in the cancelation of Greece’s international overdraft
facility.86
When the situation became untenable, the European Union was
forced to step in or face the collapse of one of its members.  Because
default by the Greeks would likely increase the cost of borrowing for
other troubled European economies, the EU had little choice but to
bail out Greece.87  In the beginning of May 2010, the European Union,
together with the International Monetary Fund, made a C= 110 billion
loan to Greece to stave off its imminent collapse.88  The EU–IMF loan
package came with significant conditions, including deficit and spend-
ing limits, tax increases, and increased retirement age for Greeks.89
On top of the EU–IMF loan package, the European Central Bank has
82. See Prospects Daily: Concern Over Greek Debt Pushes CDS Spreads to New Re-
cord, WORLD BANK BLOGS (June 24, 2010, 17:24), http://blogs.worldbank.org/
prospects/node/686.
83. See Roberts, supra note 80.
84. See Dan Bilefsky, Greek Parliament Passes Austerity Measures, N.Y. TIMES, May
5, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/world/europe/07greece.html.
85. See Landon Thomas Jr., Europeans Fear Greek Debt Crisis Will Spread, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/business/global/28euro.
html.
86. See Roberts, supra note 80.
87. See Thomas, supra note 85.
88. Roberts, supra note 80.  Greece has a long history of economic instability.  In fact,
Greece was forced to wait two years before it was permitted to adopt the Euro,
because adoption of the Euro requires satisfaction of the criteria imposed by the
Maastricht Treaty, which limit deficits, debt, and inflation. See Jack Ewing, Es-
tonia’s Adoption of Euro Advances, Despite Concerns from Central Bank, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/business/global/13
kroon.html.  Greece adopted the Euro in 2001—under false pretenses about the
extent of its deficits—and is once again violating Eurozone rules with its deficit
spending, national debt, and inflation. See id.
89. Roberts, supra note 80.
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also embarked on its own Greek sovereign debt bailout, purchasing
billions in Greek debt on the secondary market.90
B. The Collapse and Bailout of AIG
AIG’s downfall primarily resulted from the CDSs it wrote on sub-
prime mortgage backed securities.91  These credit derivatives were
sold by AIG’s financial products unit, AIGFP.92  Founded in 1987, the
financial products unit first specialized in complex derivatives like in-
terest rate swaps.93  The unit rose to prominence quickly, raking in
hundreds of millions of dollars a year for AIG.94
When Goldman Sachs, a U.S. investment bank, began issuing
mortgage backed securities in the 1990s, AIGFP “insured” Goldman’s
financial products.95  AIGFP wrote its first credit default swaps in
1998.96  Thereafter, the financial products unit flourished, bringing in
$3.26 billion of revenue at its height.97
The first step in AIG’s downfall occurred in 2005 when accounting
irregularities at the insurer were investigated by the state of New
York, and AIG’s credit rating was downgraded to AA from AAA.98
Many AIG-issued CDSs included a provision requiring AIG to post ad-
ditional collateral to secure its CDS obligations if its credit rating fell
below its long-standing AAA rating.99
The financial products unit’s relationship with Goldman flourished
for many years, but it began to suffer when subprime mortgage
backed securities covered by AIG-issued CDSs started showing signs
90. Wolfgang Reuter, German Central Bankers Suspect French Intrigue, SPIEGEL ON-
LINE, May 31, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,
00.html.  At the time that this Article went to press the prospect of a second
Greek bailout was being discussed by EU officials. See Charles Forelle, Greek
Woes Spur Tough Options, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704681904576319332030443232.html.
91. See Hilsenrath et al., supra note 11.
92. See Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer’s Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk,




95. See Morgenson & Story, supra note 55.
96. Id.
97. Morgenson, supra note 92.
98. See Diane Brady & Marcia Vickers, AIG: What Went Wrong, BLOOMBERG BUSI-
NESSWEEK, Apr. 11, 2005, at 32, 32, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/05_15/63928042_m2011.htm; Lynnley Browning, Questions
About Earnings Manipulation Weigh on A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/03/16/business/16place.
99. See Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Credit Rating Downgrade, Real Estate
Collapse Crippled AIG, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/
jan/02/business/fi-aig2.
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of distress.100  AIG’s relationship soured because Goldman had driven
hard bargains with AIG when negotiating the terms of the CDSs, and
AIG balked when Goldman sought to enforce its terms in mid-2007.101
CDSs issued to Goldman had a very low mark at which payments on
the CDSs were required.102  Some of these CDSs paid out at 4%, when
the standard mark at which payments would be made was 8%.103
Goldman also insisted that its valuations, and not those of an inde-
pendent third party, be used to determine when additional collateral
was needed to secure AIG’s potential liabilities to Goldman.104
In addition to making poor deals when writing its CDSs, AIG also
failed to hedge its CDS positions.105  As discussed in the introduction,
many CDS protection sellers balance their risk by purchasing
equivalent protection.106  When risks are balanced, default by the
CDS’s reference entity will result in a payout by the protection seller
that is balanced by the payout it receives as protection purchaser on
the balancing CDS.107
AIG did not purchase protection to balance its risk in the CDSs it
wrote.108  As an insurance company, AIG treated the credit default
swaps as if they were insurance policies.109  With insurance business,
the insurance company can generally depend on paying out on a pre-
dictable schedule.110  Barring a catastrophic natural disaster, only a
small number of policies—whether property or life insurance—will re-
quire payment at any one time.111  If premiums are calculated cor-
rectly, premiums paid to the insurance company will be greater than
payouts made by the company.112  In contrast, payouts on CDSs de-
pend on the health of the greater economy.113  During a downturn in
the economy, credit events triggering payout on CDSs are more likely
to happen en masse.114
Because AIG wrote CDSs without purchasing corresponding pro-
tection, when the global recession took hold, the reference assets be-
gan defaulting, and AIG was faced with making $440 billion in





105. See Morgenson, supra note 92.
106. See discussion supra section II.A.
107. See discussion supra section II.A.
108. See Morgenson, supra note 92.
109. Id.
110. LES COLEMAN, RISK STRATEGIES: DIALLING UP OPTIMUM FIRM RISK 106–07 (2009).
111. Id. at 107.
112. Id.
113. See Morgenson, supra note 1.
114. See id.
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payouts on CDSs.115  When AIG’s ability to satisfy its liabilities be-
came increasingly dubious, credit-rating agencies lowered AIG’s credit
rating.116  When AIG’s credit rating decreased, it was required by its
CDS contracts to put up more collateral to guarantee its obliga-
tions.117  Unable to satisfy its CDSs and collateral obligations or se-
cure private funds to balance its books, AIG was forced to seek
government assistance.118
AIG’s exposure to CDSs meant that protection purchasers were de-
pending on AIG to satisfy its end of $440 billion in CDSs.119  Default
by AIG on its CDS obligations would have caused further disruption in
the economy, resulting in default through a vast network of protection
purchasers, including banks and hedge funds.120  Because of the
broad implications of an AIG collapse for the rest of the economy, the
Federal Reserve stepped in on September 16, 2008, authorizing credit
of up to $85 billion—later increased to $182 billion—to shore up the
insurance company’s balance sheet.121
C. Similarities Between Greece and AIG
There were many players common to both the Greek and AIG de-
bacles, but principal among them was Goldman Sachs.  Like AIG, the
Greek government entered into complex derivatives transactions that
hid the risk underlying its position.122  In 2001, right before Greece
entered the European Union, and again just months before the Greek
crisis peaked, Goldman Sachs entered into complex derivatives trans-
actions with Greece that essentially allowed Greece to borrow billions
without adding to its public debt.123  AIG brought in billions in premi-
ums on CDSs, many written for Goldman, without tipping off regula-
tors to its precarious position.124
Although innovative finance provides markets and society in gen-
eral with many benefits, it has proven to be a risky business, contrib-
uting to financial meltdown and the global recession.  Both the AIG
115. Gretchen Morgenson, No Bottom Yet to AIG Money Pit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/business/worldbusiness/08iht-morg09.1.206
69158.html.
116. See Morgenson, supra note 92.
117. Morgenson, supra note 115.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. See Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, In U.S. Bailout of A.I.G., Forgiveness
for Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/
business/30aig.html.
121. Id.
122. See Louise Story, Wall St. Helped to Mask Debt Fueling Europe’s Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/business/global/14debt.
html.
123. Id.
124. See Morgenson & Story, supra note 55.
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collapse and Greek debt crisis resulted in public bailouts, essentially
shifting the cost of poor financial decisionmaking by Wall Street to
Main Street.  Public outrage over the bailouts has forced legislators to
act.  The question remains, however: How much regulation is enough?
Legislatures and regulators did not grasp the intricacies of prod-
ucts like CDSs and failed to recognize their potential to bring down
the global economy.  Even now, with the benefit of hindsight, world-
wide regulators struggle to bring together a coordinated solution to
what turned out to be a global problem.  The U.S. Congress has taken
a measured approach, introducing measures designed to bring credit
derivatives under the regulatory spotlight.  In contrast, the developing
European approach calls for greater market transparency and takes
aim at speculation, specifically targeting “naked short” positions, in-
cluding uncovered CDS.  The following section examines the restric-
tive approach and whether insurance provides a useful policy
analogue for problems involving credit derivatives.
IV. U.S. REGULATION OF CDSs
A. Introduction
Prior to passage of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, most credit default swaps were generally unreg-
ulated in the United States.125  In fact, Congress explicitly kept swaps
unregulated when it passed the Commodity Futures Modernization
Act of 2000.126  The Commodity Futures Modernization Act removed
swaps from regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) as securities, although the SEC was given jurisdiction over
“fraud, manipulation, [and] insider trading” involving “security-based
swaps.”127
CDSs—unregulated themselves—are frequently written or pur-
chased, in the first instance, by unregulated parties like hedge
funds.128  In many cases, these protection sellers hedge their risk by
purchasing protection themselves.129  In other cases, an investor
purchases protection, and when spreads increase, sells an amount of
protection equivalent to that purchased.130  The investor profits to the
extent that premiums on sold protection exceed premiums on pur-
chased protection.
125. See Floyd Norris, Naked Truth on Default Swaps, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/business/economy/21norris.html.
126. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 103,
114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-377 (2000).
127. See id. § 302, 114 Stat. at 2763A-451.
128. See Pierre-Louis, supra note 14, at 88–90.
129. See id. at 89–90.
130. See id.
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These activities create a chain of protection sellers and purchasers,
each dependent on the solvency of many others if a credit event occurs.
In the financial crisis, AIG was in many instances the last link in nu-
merous CDS chains, having sold protection without hedging its own
risks.131  While many intermediate players had hedged their risks,
the potential collapse of AIG threatened numerous CDS counterpar-
ties, because all of the parties depended on counterparties up the
chain that ended with AIG.132  One default by a protection seller like
AIG would result in total collapse of the chain.133  While scores of
market participants stood to profit from these transactions, they all
stood or fell together because of their interconnection.  Thus, losses
due, for example, to one counterparty’s default on a CDS with a no-
tional amount of $10 million are compounded for each counterparty up
the chain.  What would have been a $10 million loss becomes a $50 or
$100 million loss or more, because default by one protection seller
forces default by all protection sellers who purchased protection from
the defaulting seller or another party who did.
In addition to creating a chain of dependent transactions that mul-
tiplied losses, CDSs also jeopardized banks’ balance sheets. CDSs
were used by banks to hedge their investments in risky mortgage-
backed securities.134  When banks used CDSs to hedge their risk, the
banks’ reserves were freed up.135  This additional liquidity was, in
many cases, invested in further risky investments.136  Then, when the
market began to slide and a multitude of credit events occurred simul-
taneously, financial institutions sought payout on CDSs from entities
that were unable to make the payments.137  These institutions were
left with inadequate reserves and massive uncovered losses.  Without
government assistance, these entities would have collapsed.
This threatened systemic collapse—which was fended off by the
federal bailout—was the worst-case result.  The difficulty of assessing
counterparty risk on a case-by-case basis precipitated this systemic
risk and motivates the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act’s focus on transparency in the CDS market.
Counterparty risk is particularly difficult to assess in the CDS mar-
ket, because the market in CDSs is not cleared or conducted on an
exchange; instead CDSs are traded in the over-the-counter markets.
Over-the-counter trades are negotiated between the buyer and seller,
either through brokers or via an electronic trading platform.138  Al-
131. See Morgenson, supra note 92.
132. See id.
133. See id.




138. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (9th ed. 2009).
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though subject to fewer regulations than exchange trading, over-the-
counter trading has become highly organized in the past twenty years.
In contrast to over-the-counter trades, exchange traded securities
and derivatives are traded on an exchange, which is a third party en-
tity providing facilities bringing buyers and sellers together.139  Ex-
change trades are typically conducted through the exchange’s
clearinghouse, which acts as a central counterparty for the trades.140
“Counterparties” to a trade taking place through a clearinghouse do
not contract with each other; rather, each party contracts with the
clearinghouse.141
Financial regulators were largely in the dark about market partici-
pants’ total exposure to CDSs.  Both regulators and often protection
purchasers themselves could not be certain how much exposure pro-
tection sellers had to particular reference entities and assets.142  A
protection seller, for instance, may have had a superior credit rating
and an apparent ability to make good on a particular CDS obligation,
but a seller’s net exposure to CDSs could make its position untenable
in a system wide downturn.  AIG is the most obvious example.
The intersection between this “dark” CDS market and regulated
participants like AIG and the investment bank, Bear Stearns, became
a hazardous tangle of the visible and invisible.  Because the CDS mar-
ket is unregulated and largely dark, counterparties to AAA-rated AIG-
issued CDSs believed that their counterparty-risk was near zero.
However, because CDSs are unregulated and traded over-the-counter,
no one fully grasped the size of the CDS market or its capacity to bring
down the world economy.
B. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act
1. Introduction to the Act
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(the Act)143 includes substantial changes for the CDS market, al-
though it stops short of restricting the uncovered purchase of CDSs—
as called for by a vocal contingent of commentators.144  Title VII of the
Act includes a number of sections amending the Commodity Exchange
139. See id. at 645.
140. BRIAN A. EALES & MOORAD CHOUDHRY, DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS: A GUIDE TO
THEORY AND PRACTICE 69 (2003).
141. See id.; see also infra subsection IV.B.3 (discussing “clearing”).
142. See Pierre-Louis, supra note 14, at 88.
143. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
144. See, e.g., Mu¨nchau, supra note 37 (arguing that naked credit default swaps are
“purely speculative gamble[s]”).
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Act145 and the Securities Exchange Act146 to grant jurisdiction to the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and SEC147 over
what are termed “swaps”148 and “swaps entities.”149  The Act also cre-
ates the Financial Stability Oversight Council150 (the Council), a nine
member panel charged with overseeing systemic risk to the economy
and empowered to take steps to minimize that risk.151  For instance,
the Council is given the power to subject non-bank financial compa-
nies to federal supervision.152
The Act includes four principle components tailored to prevent
CDSs from taking an active role in future financial catastrophes.  In
particular, the Act:
(1) defines “security-based swaps” to include CDSs,153 granting the
SEC regulatory authority over CDSs;154
(2) requires clearing of CDSs;155
(3) requires registration of “swap dealers” and “major swap partici-
pants”;156 and
145. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (codified as amended at
7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27f).
146. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a–77oo).
147. At the time this Article went to press, the SEC and CFTC had proposed joint
definitions of “swaps” and “security-based swaps” under the Act. See Press Re-
lease, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Product Definitions for Swaps (Apr.
27, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-99.htm.
148. In this Article, I use the word “swap” to indicate both “swaps,” see Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 721(a)(21), 124 Stat. at
1666–71, and “security-based swaps,” see id. § 761, 124 Stat. at 1756–57, unless
the context indicates otherwise.  Any reference to SEC regulation of swaps should
be taken as a reference exclusively to “security-based swaps,” since the CFTC has
jurisdiction over “swaps,” id. § 722(a), 124 Stat. at 1672, but not “security-based
swaps.” See id. § 772(b), 124 Stat. at 1801–02.  Much of the Act’s treatment of
“security-based swaps” and its grant of authority to the SEC are mirrored in the
Act’s treatment of “swaps” and its grant of authority to the CFTC. Compare id.
§ 721, 124 Stat. at 1658–72 (defining terms that are relevant primarily to the
CFTC under Subtitle A—Regulation of Over-the-Counter Swaps Markets, Part
II—Regulation of Swap Markets), with id. § 761, 124 Stat. at 1754–59 (defining
terms that are relevant primarily to the SEC under Subtitle B—Regulation of
Security-Based Swap Markets); see also id. § 712, 124 Stat. at 1641–47 (providing
a framework for the split of regulatory authority between the SEC and CFTC).
149. Id. § 716, 124 Stat. at 1648–51.
150. Id. § 111, 124 Stat. at 1392–95.
151. See id. § 112(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1394–95.
152. See id. § 113, 124 Stat. at 1398–402.
153. See id. § 721(a)(21), 124 Stat. at 1666–67 (listing credit default swaps as a type of
“swap”); id. § 761(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1756–57 (defining which types of “swaps”
constitute “security-based swaps”).
154. See id. § 762(a), 124 Stat. at 1759.
155. Id. § 763(a), 124 Stat. at 1762–68.
156. Id. § 731, 124 Stat. at 1703.
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(4) establishes the “swap pushout rule,”157 which restricts any gov-
ernment bailout of a “swaps entity.”158
These four components are discussed in the following sections.
2. SEC/CFTC Jurisdiction Over “Swaps” Under the Act
The Act takes a number of steps necessary to shift CDSs from un-
regulated instruments to regulated “securities.”  First, the Act repeals
the provisions of the Securities Act159 and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act160
that prohibited the SEC and the states from regulating swaps.161  Sec-
tion 302 of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000162
amended the Securities Act of 1933 to prohibit the SEC from “register-
ing, or requiring, recommending, or suggesting, the registration . . . of
any security-based swap agreement . . . .”163  The Act repealed two
provisions under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, nullify-
ing the prohibition against SEC regulation.164
Second, the Act grants the SEC and CFTC specific powers over
what it terms “swaps”165 and “security-based swaps.”166  The terms
encompass a comprehensive panoply of derivatives, including CDSs
and other credit derivatives.167  Generally, CDSs with SEC regulated
reference assets—like corporate bonds—are subject to SEC regulation
as “security-based swaps.”168  Many other derivatives that are classi-
fied by the Act as “swaps” are subject to the CFTC’s jurisdiction.169
157. See generally Annette L. Nazareth, Dodd–Frank Act Finalizes Swap Pushout
Rule, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 7, 2010,
9:13AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/07/dodd-frank-act-finaliz
es-swap-pushout-rule/ (discussing the inclusion and major provisions of the
“Swap Pushout Rule” in the Act).
158. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 716, 124 Stat. at
1648–51.
159. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a
(2000)).
160. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (as amended
by Sections 301 and 302 of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 301–02, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-451 (2000)).
161. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 762, 124
Stat. at 1759–62.
162. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000).
163. Id. § 302(a), 114 Stat. at 2763A-451.
164. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 762(a), 124 Stat.
at 1759 (repealing sections 206B and 206C of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub.
L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338).
165. Id. § 722(a), 124 Stat. at 1672.
166. Id. § 772(b), 124 Stat. at 1801–02.
167. See id. § 721(a)(21), 124 Stat. at 1666–67; id. § 761(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1757.
168. See id. § 761(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1756.
169. See id. § 722(a), 124 Stat. at 1672.
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Treatment of CDSs and other security-based swaps as securities
subject to SEC jurisdiction will have a profound effect on the industry.
For instance, in addition to classifying CDSs as securities subject to
the SEC’s jurisdiction, the Act also amends the Securities Act to re-
quire that security-based swaps must be issued with a prospectus if
issued to a person who is not an “eligible contract participant.”170
3. Clearing for CDS
From their inception, CDSs largely have been traded over-the-
counter.171  The Act includes a requirement that many more CDS
transactions be cleared through a registered clearing agency.172
Moreover, security-based swaps that are subject to the mandatory
clearing requirement must be traded on an SEC regulated exchange
or swap execution facility, unless a centralized market for the swap is
otherwise unavailable.173  The Act does not include a laundry list of
swaps that must be cleared.  Instead, it empowers the SEC to estab-
lish rules to determine which groups, categories, types, and classes of
security-based swaps will be subject to the clearing requirement, so
the full extent of the clearing requirement will not be known for some
time.174
The uncertainty created by giving the SEC responsibility for deter-
mining the scope of the clearing requirement threatens the trans-
parency objectives of the Act—although, swaps that are not subject to
the clearing requirement are subject to a reporting requirement.175  A
swap that is not required to be cleared must nevertheless be reported
by both counterparties to “a registered swap data repository.”176
In addition to giving the SEC the power to require clearing for se-
curity-based swaps, the Act also authorizes the SEC to make swap
transaction and pricing data available to the public in order to en-
hance the price discovery process.177  The SEC is authorized to re-
quire real-time public reporting of all swap transactions, whether
cleared or not.178
In addition to the transparency provided by giving the SEC access
to clearing data, the Act also gives the SEC and CFTC the power to
collect information and issue reports about abusive swaps, which are
swaps and security-based swaps that the agencies determine to be
170. See id. § 768(b), 124 Stat. at 1801.
171. CHOUDHRY, supra note 31, at 2.
172. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 763(a), 124 Stat.
at 1762–68.
173. See id. § 763(a), 124 Stat. at 1767
174. See id. § 763(a), 124 Stat. at 1763.
175. Id. § 766, 124 Stat. at 1797.
176. Id. § 727, 124 Stat. at 1696.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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“detrimental to . . . the stability of a financial market . . . or . . . partici-
pants in financial markets.”179
4. Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based
Swap Participants
The transparency brought to the CDS market by the Act’s clearing
requirement is bolstered by the Act’s grant to the SEC of regulatory
authority over persons that qualify as “security-based swap dealers”
or “major security-based swap participants.”180  These provisions will
bring the identity of major CDS market participants to light,181 re-
quire they meet minimum standards necessary to ensure the stability
of the marketplace,182 and impose recordkeeping requirements on
them.183  The legislation sets forth a broad definition of security-based
swap dealers184 and major security-based swap participants185 that
179. Id. § 714, 124 Stat. at 1647.
180. See id. § 764, 124 Stat. at 1784–96.
181. See id. § 764(a), 124 Stat. at 1785.
182. See id. § 764(a), 124 Stat. at 1786–88.
183. See id. § 764(a), 124 Stat. at 1788–89.
184. See id.  § 761(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1758.  A “security-based swap dealer” is defined
as:
[A]ny person who—
(i) holds themself out as a dealer in security-based swaps;
(ii) makes a market in security-based swaps;
(iii) regularly enters into security-based swaps with counterparties as an
ordinary course of business for its own account; or
(iv) engages in any activity causing it to be commonly known in the trade
as a dealer or market maker in security-based swaps.
Id.
185. See id. § 761(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1755–56. A “major security-based swap partici-
pant” is defined as:
[A]ny person—
(i) who is not a security-based swap dealer; and
(ii)(I) who maintains a substantial position in security-based swaps for
any of the major security-based swap categories, as such categories are
determined by the Commission, excluding both positions held for hedg-
ing or mitigating commercial risk and positions maintained by any em-
ployee benefit plan (or any contract held by such a plan) as defined in
paragraphs (3) and (32) of section 3 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002) for the primary purpose of hedging
or mitigating any risk directly associated with the operation of the plan;
(II) whose outstanding security-based swaps create substantial counter-
party exposure that could have serious adverse effects on the financial
stability of the United States banking system or financial markets; or
(III) that is a financial entity that–
(aa) is highly leveraged relative to the amount of capital such entity
holds and  that is no subject to capital requirements established by
an appropriate Federal banking agency; and
(bb) maintains a substantial position in outstanding security-based
swaps in any major security-based swap category, as such catego-
ries are determined by the Commission.
Id.
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must register, and it empowers the SEC and CFTC to propose more
specific regulation, after public comment, on the new registration
requirements.186
Both security-based swap dealers and major security-based swap
participants are subject to a laundry list of requirements and stan-
dards, each crafted to ensure that the central players in the market
are capable of performing their CDS contracts and do not generate
unacceptable levels of systemic risk.187  Among other requirements,
the Act mandates that entities falling into these categories must regis-
ter with the SEC,188 satisfy an SEC mandated minimum capital re-
quirement,189 and report to the SEC on their swaps activities.190
5. Restriction on Government Bailouts of Swaps Entities—the
“Swap Pushout Rule”
In part due to the public outcry over the bailouts in the financial
sector, section 716 of the Act191 generally prohibits government
bailouts in the form of federal assistance192 to swaps entities.193  This
rule will motivate some depository institutions to move their swaps
186. Id. § 761(b), 124 Stat. at 1759.
187. See id. § 764, 124 Stat. at 1784–96.  Additionally, the Act requires security-based
swap dealers and major swap participants to conform with business conduct
standards pertaining to fraud, manipulation, and special entities. See id.
§ 764(a), 124 Stat. at 1789–92.  The Act also imposes duties pertaining to moni-
toring trading, managing risk, disclosing information, implementing conflict of
interest systems and procedures, and designating a chief compliance officer. See
id. § 764, 124 Stat. at 1792–94.
188. See id. § 764(a), 124 Stat. at 1785–86.
189. See id. § 764(a), 124 Stat. at 1786–88.
190. See id. § 764(a), 124 Stat. at 1788–89.
191. Id. § 716, 124 Stat. at 1648–51.
192. “Federal Assistance” is defined as:
[T]he use of any advances from any Federal Reserve credit facility or discount
window that is not part of a program or facility with broad-based eligibility under
section 13(3)(A) of the Federal Reserve Act, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion insurance or guarantees for the purpose of—
(A) making any loan to, or purchasing any stock, equity interest, or debt
obligation of, any swaps entity;
(B) purchasing the assets of any swaps entity;
(C) guaranteeing any loan or debt issuance of any swaps entity; or
(D) entering into any assistance arrangement (including tax breaks),
loss sharing, or profit sharing with any swaps entity.
Id. § 716(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1648.
193. A “swaps entity” is defined as “any swap dealer, security-based swap dealer, ma-
jor swap participant, [or] major security-based swap participant” that is regis-
tered under the Commodity Exchange Act or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Id. § 716(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1648.  However, if a “major swap participant or
major security-based swap participant . . . is an insured depository institution,”
then it is excluded from this definition. Id. § 716(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1648.
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activities to non-bank affiliates or cease swaps trading altogether.194
However, exceptions to the general prohibition threaten to swallow
the rule, and the exposure of many financial institutions to CDS risk
will continue.195
Major swap participants196 and major security-based swap partici-
pants197 that are insured depository institutions are excluded from
the prohibition on federal assistance.198  In contrast, insured deposi-
tory institutions that are major swap dealers are covered by the prohi-
bition on federal assistance, but the prohibition does not cover these
institutions if their swap and security-based swap activities are lim-
ited to hedging and risk management activities or “acting as a swaps
entity for swaps or security-based swaps involving rates or reference
assets that are permissible for investment by a national bank.”199
Note that, while these banks are prohibited from dealing in equity se-
curities, they are not prohibited from dealing in investment grade
debt securities, which are often CDS reference assets.200
194. See id. § 716(c), 124 Stat. at 1648 (“The prohibition on Federal assistance con-
tained in subsection (a) does not apply to and shall not prevent an insured deposi-
tory institution from having or establishing an affiliate which is a swaps
entity . . . .”).
195. See id. § 716(l), 124 Stat. at 1651.  As a catch-all, the Act grants the Financial
Stability Oversight Council the authority to prohibit federal assistance for swap
entities “when other provisions established by this Act are insufficient to effec-
tively mitigate systemic risk and protect taxpayers.” Id.
196. A “major swap participant” is defined as:
[A]ny person who is not a swap dealer, and—
(i) maintains a substantial position in swaps for any of the major
swap categories as determined by the Commission, excluding—
(I) positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk; and
(II) positions maintained by any employee benefit plan (or any
contract held by such a plan) as defined in paragraphs (3) and
(32) of section 3 of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002) for the primary purpose of hedging
or mitigating any risk directly associated with the operation of
the plan;
(ii) whose outstanding swaps create substantial counterparty expo-
sure that could have serious adverse effects on the financial stability
of the United States banking system or financial markets; or
(iii)(I) is a financial entity that is highly leveraged relative to the
amount of capital it holds and that is not subject to capital require-
ments established by an appropriate Federal banking agency; and
(II) maintains a substantial position in outstanding swaps in any
major swap category as determined by the Commission.
Id. § 721(a)(16), 124 Stat. at 1663.
197. Id. § 761(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1755–56
198. Id. § 716(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1648.
199. Id. § 716(d)(2), 124 Stat. at 1648.
200. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006) (“As used in this section the term “invest-
ment securities” shall mean marketable obligations, evidencing indebtedness of
any person . . . in the form of bonds, notes and/or debentures commonly known as
investment securities under such further definition of the term ‘investment se-
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The Act also prohibits the use of taxpayer funds to prevent a swaps
entity’s receivership resulting from swap activity if that entity is
FDIC insured or designated as “systemically significant.”201  An FDIC
insured or systemically significant swap institution that is declared
insolvent or is put into receivership due to swap activity may have its
swap activity terminated or transferred.202  Taxpayer funds are pro-
hibited from being used to liquidate a swaps entity that is not FDIC
insured and not systemically significant.203  The Act also includes a
broad prohibition that “[t]axpayers shall bear no losses from the exer-
cise of any authority under” Title VII of the Act , including all of the
provisions relating to swaps and security-based swaps activity.204
In addition to prohibiting federal bailouts of swaps entities, the Act
also prohibits banks and bank holding companies from being or be-
coming swaps entities unless satisfying minimum standards set by
the bank’s prudential regulator.205  The prudential regulators are
given wide regulatory latitude to ensure that banks that are or be-
come swaps entities are not a threat to systemic financial stability.206
Although the pushout rule goes a long way toward mitigating the
extent to which banks socialize the costs of risky swaps transactions,
the rule does not prohibit an insured depository institution from es-
tablishing or having an affiliate that is a swaps entity, subject to some
limitations.207
V. EUROPEAN PROPOSALS FOR REGULATION OF CDSs
While the U.S. regulatory response to CDSs is motivated in large
part by the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the threatened collapse of AIG,
and the obliteration of hundreds of U.S. banks, the prime motivator
curities’ as may by regulation be prescribed by the Comptroller of the
Currency.”).
201. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 716(i)(1)(B), 124
Stat. at 1650.
202. Id.
203. Id. § 716(i)(1)(C), 124 Stat. at 1650.
204. Id. § 716(i)(3), 124 Stat. at 1650.
205. Id. § 716(j), 124 Stat. at 1650.
206. Id.
207. See id. § 716(c); 124 Stat. at 1648.  A depository institution may have an affiliate
who is a swaps entity and not be prohibited from receiving federal assistance, so
long as:
[S]uch insured depository institution is part of a bank holding company,
or savings and loan holding company, that is supervised by the Federal
Reserve and such swaps entity affiliate complies with sections 23A and
23B of the Federal Reserve Act and such other requirements as the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission or the Securities Exchange Com-
mission, as appropriate, and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, may determine to be necessary and appropriate.
Id.
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behind the European response appears to be the financial instability
of regional (but sovereign) governments, like Greece.  CDSs written on
Greece’s sovereign debt are blamed for increasing the Greek govern-
ment’s cost of borrowing and decreasing investor confidence in its sta-
bility, amplifying the debt crisis and ultimately necessitating a bailout
by the IMF.208  Shortly after the Greek debt crisis surfaced early in
2010, financial speculators were targeted as exacerbating the prob-
lem.209  In response to the perception that speculators were responsi-
ble for intensifying the crisis, Jose´ Manuel Dura˜o Barroso, President
of the European Commission—the European Union’s executive
agency—announced that the Commission would consider a ban on na-
ked short selling and uncovered sovereign CDSs—those CDSs that
use government issued debt as their reference entity.210  He justified a
potential ban by reference to insurance:  “It’s hard to justify why mar-
ket players should purchase insurance against risks to which they are
not themselves exposed.”211  Greek Prime Minister George Papan-
dreou also spoke out early in the crisis blaming speculators—includ-
ing investors who purchase CDSs without owning the underlying
reference asset—for its rapid escalation.212
Prompted by the Greek crisis, Germany unilaterally banned short
selling and uncovered CDSs in Eurozone debt on May 19, 2010.213
The ban was temporary and scheduled to last for one year.214  The
German financial regulator, BaFin, has stated that it banned the
transactions in an effort to increase stability in the debt markets.215
Although France initially balked at Germany’s unilateral action,
within a month after the ban French President Nicholas Sarkozy
joined with German Chancellor Angela Merkel to call for a ban on na-
ked short selling and trading in uncovered sovereign CDSs.216  Writ-
208. See Schwartz & Dash, supra note 19.
209. See id.
210. Stephen Fidler et al., Swaps Come Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2010, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704784904575111191528470212.html.
211. Id.
212. See Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks with Greek Prime Minster
George Papandreou After Their Meeting (Mar. 8, 2010), available at http://www.
state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/03/137951.htm; see also Rebecca Christie, Papan-
dreou Sees ‘New Will’ in EU to Manage Crises, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 10, 2010, 12:14
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=A25PYt
TYmgzs (explaining that Prime Minister Papandreou views the regulation of
speculators as necessary for Greece’s austerity measures to succeed).
213. See Geir Moulson, German Regulator Issues Naked Short-Selling Ban, USA TO-




216. See Germany, France Urge EU-Wide Ban on ‘Naked’ Short-Selling, CNN (June 9,
2010, 8:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/06/09/europe.short.selling/
index.html.
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ing together, they stated, “The [European Commission’s] work should
encompass the possibility of an EU-wide prohibition of naked short
selling of all or certain shares and sovereign bonds as well as of all or
certain naked sovereign CDS (credit default swaps) and its
conditions.”217
The European Commission pulled back from its initial considera-
tion of a ban on naked CDSs in Eurozone debt.218  Motivated by the
weakening of the Euro by the Greek crisis, the European Commission
summoned its member states to Brussels in May 2010 to discuss the
regulation of sovereign CDSs.  The meeting culminated with the Com-
mission backing a plan to ban some types of speculative trading in
sovereign CDSs.219  Using the results from its investigation, the Com-
mission proposed regulations on September 15, 2010, that will provide
an EU-wide, coordinated response to “disorderly markets and sys-
temic risks.”220
The EU’s financial reform strategy includes emergency powers
under which member states will be given the power to restrict or en-
tirely prohibit particular types of CDS transactions.221  Exercise of
these emergency powers would be limited initially to a duration of
three months222 and would require members to coordinate any ban or
restriction through the newly formed European Securities Market Au-
thority (ESMA).223
The proposed regulations would also introduce transparency re-
quirements into some trades in CDSs relating to EU sovereign debt
issuers.  Persons with uncovered positions or net short positions in
sovereign debt would be required to privately inform member state
regulators of their net short positions.224  Member states also would
be given the power under the regulations to enact further trans-
217. See id.
218. See James Kanter, E.U. Refuses to Be Rushed on Regulating Financial Practices,
N.Y. TIMES, June, 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/business/global/
10euro.html.
219. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Central
Bank—Regulating Fin. Servs. for Sustainable Growth, EUROPA, 8 (June 2,
2010), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/general/com2010_en.
pdf.
220. Press Release, European Comm’n, New Framework to Increase Transparency
and Ensure Coordination for Short Selling and Credit Default Swaps (Sept. 15,
2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/
10/1126&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
221. See EC Proposed Regulation, supra note 40, arts. 16–19.
222. See id. art. 20.  Under the proposed regulation, any emergency measure enacted
by a member state is only initially valid for a period of three months; however, an
emergency measure “may be renewed for further periods not exceeding three
months at a time.” Id.
223. See id. arts. 22, 23.
224. See id. art. 8.
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parency measures—such as requiring the public disclosure of market
participants’ short positions—in emergency situations.225
Although the EU pulled back from completely banning uncovered
CDSs, its strongest members have demonstrated a willingness to re-
strict uncovered trades.  On July 9, 2010, Germany’s Parliament
passed legislation prohibiting some naked short selling and uncovered
Eurozone sovereign CDS positions.226  The ban was inapplicable if the
protection purchaser was hedging a position in the CDS’s reference
assets and the purchase of protection would result in a “significant
reduction of the credit risk deriving from the existing position.”227
Germany’s requirement that protection purchasers be exposed to
credit risk in the CDS’s reference obligation harkens to the often re-
peated comparisons between CDSs and insurance policies.  An insur-
ance policy cannot be purchased unless the purchaser has a
financial—or in the case of life insurance, familial—interest in the
risk insured under the policy.228  This insurable interest requirement
has largely prevented speculation or gambling in insurance policies
for hundreds of years.229  Germany’s statute essentially requires that
a protection purchaser have an insurable interest in the CDS’s refer-
ence assets.  The question is whether this curb on speculation will con-
tribute to greater financial stability.  The next three sections of this
Article examine whether imposition of an insurable interest require-
ment on CDSs is an effective means of ensuring that CDSs do not con-
tribute to future financial catastrophes.
VI. THE INSURABLE INTEREST REQUIREMENT
A. Introduction
The argument that credit default swaps should be regulated like
insurance policies was made succinctly by George Soros: “Credit de-
fault swaps (CDS) are particularly dangerous [because] they allow
people to buy insurance on the survival of a company or a country
while handing them a license to kill.  CDS[s] ought to be available to
buyers only to the extent that they have a legitimate insurable inter-
225. See id. art. 16.
226. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 17/1952 (Ger.); see also CLIFFORD
CHANCE, GERMAN PARLIAMENT ADOPTS BAN ON NAKED SHORT-SELLING AND UN-
COVERED SOVEREIGN CDS TRADING—UPDATE 4, at 1 (2010), available at http://
www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications /2010 /07 /germany_bans_
nakedshort-sellinganduncovere.html [hereinafter GERMAN PARLIAMENT ADOPTS
BAN] (explaining the provisions of the German ban).
227. See GERMAN PARLIAMENT ADOPTS BAN, supra note 226, at 2.
228. See RAY HODGIN, INSURANCE LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 56–57 (2d ed. 2002).
229. See id. at 55–56.
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est.”230  Likewise, Philip Gisdakis, head of credit strategy at
UniCredit in Munich, described the danger of CDSs in insurance
terms: “It’s like buying fire insurance on your neighbor’s house—you
create an incentive to burn down the house.”231
A person who is permitted to purchase an insurance policy on a
neighbor’s property has no incentive—other than the threat of crimi-
nal prosecution—to preserve his neighbor’s property.232  It is in the
policy purchaser’s best financial interest for the property to be de-
stroyed, since he or she is paying premiums on the policy and will see
a return on that investment only if the property is destroyed.  Like-
wise, it is argued, an investor who is permitted to purchase a credit
default swap on a bond that the investor does not own has an incen-
tive to manipulate the market in order to weaken the CDS’s reference
entity and force a default.233
B. Origin of the Insurable Interest Requirement
The law discourages the purchase of insurance on a stranger’s
property by imposing an insurable interest requirement on insurance
policies.234  Because of the similar risks presented by CDSs and insur-
ance policies, it is argued that imposition of an insurable interest re-
quirement on CDSs is the appropriate regulatory means of
eliminating the incentive to manipulate the financial stability of refer-
ence entities.235
The insurable interest requirement developed on the heels of the
British life insurance market.  More than 200 years before the late
twentieth century development of the secondary market for life insur-
ance and stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI),236 London had a
230. George Soros, Inst. of Int’l Fin. Spring Membership Meeting Address, Vienna
(June 10, 2010), available at http://www.georgesoros.com/interviews-speeches/
entry/iif_spring_membership_meeting_address_june_10_20101/.
231. Schwartz & Dash, supra note 19.
232. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 201 (4th ed. 2005)
(“The predominant justification now given for the requirement of an insurable
interest is that it combats moral hazard: in the absence of an insurable interest
held by the party procuring insurance, the incentive to destroy insured property
or persons would be considerably greater.”).
233. See, e.g., Soros, supra note 230.
234. See ABRAHAM, supra note 232.
235. E.g., Soros, supra note 230.
236. See N.Y. Court Says You Can Sell Your Life Insurance Policy, USA TODAY,
Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/insurance/2010-11-17-life-
insurance-sale_N.htm; see also Robert S. Bloink, Catalysts for Clarification: Mod-
ern Twists on the Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance, 16 CONN.
INS. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing at length the insurable interest require-
ment for life insurance).
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bustling market in stranger-initiated policies.237  Where the modern
secondary market is an ordered, developed market, the eighteenth
century market more resembled an underground gambling house.238
The commodity “traded“ in these exchanges—which often took place
in social settings—was life insurance policies, often taken out on the
lives of the famous.239  The price of policies in London increased or
decreased depending on the health or military success of the in-
sured.240  These practices eventually led to public condemnation of the
practice of gambling on the lives of others, and Parliament passed the
Gambling Act of 1774, which outlawed the purchase of insurance on a
life or event if the purchaser does not have an interest—referred to as
an “insurable interest”—in the subject matter of the policy.241
In the life insurance context, an insurable interest in the life of an
individual is based on either: (1) “love and affection” or (2) a “substan-
tial economic interest” in the continued life of that individual.242
“Love and affection” typically manifests itself as a close familial rela-
tionship, and a “substantial economic interest” generally results from
a business relationship.243  With respect to fire insurance, an insura-
ble interest is limited to a financial interest—like ownership or a
mortgage interest—in the property insured.244
The insurable interest requirement for life insurance was inspired
by two related policy considerations: (1) the moral hazard of allowing a
person to purchase life insurance on an unrelated stranger; and (2)
the perceived immorality of gambling on human lives.245  The moral
237. GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN EN-
GLAND, 1695–1775, at 49–53 (1999).
238. See id.
239. See id. at 49 (“Bets on lives took place in a variety of genteel settings, such as at
dinner parties and in gentlemen’s clubs, but insurance offices served as the pri-
mary site for such wagers . . . .  Men and women in the public eye usually sup-
plied the subjects for these gaming policies . . . .”).
240. See id. at 49–50 (“Higher premiums were charged, for example, on the much-
insured life of Robert Walpole during the Excise Crisis; and during the Jacobite
rebellion of 1745 the price of policies on the lives of the Pretender and the rebel
lords rose or fell with each new report of their military advance.”).
241. See id. at 53; see also Bloink, supra note 236.
242. See ABRAHAM, supra note 232, at 7.
243. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(a) (West 2010).
An insurable interest, with reference to life and disability insurance, is
an interest based upon a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage
through the continued life, health, or bodily safety of another person and
consequent loss by reason of that person’s death or disability or a sub-
stantial interest engendered by love and affection in the case of individu-
als closely related by blood or law.
Id.
244. See, e.g., id. § 281.
245. See ABRAHAM, supra note 232, at 7.
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hazard problem exists for all types of insurance.246  A moral hazard is
present when a policy is purchased without an insurable interest be-
cause the policy purchaser may be motivated to accelerate the return
on his investment by killing the insured individual or destroying the
insured property.247  Presumably there will be countervailing forces—
love and affection or a financial interest—that disincentive destruc-
tion of the subject of the policy when the party purchasing insurance
has an insurable interest.248
C. New York’s Attempt to Regulate CDSs as Insurance
The New York State Insurance Department (NYSID) previously
has considered regulating CDSs as insurance.  Although New York’s
insurance law and administrative regulations do not specify whether
CDSs are subject to regulation as insurance products, the NYSID is-
sued opinions and circular letters expressing its intent to regulate
some CDSs.
The NYSID’s first major action with respect to CDSs was to issue a
private opinion letter excluding some CDSs from regulation as insur-
ance contracts.249  Specifically, a CDS with a payout that is “not de-
pendent upon the buyer having suffered a loss” was excluded from
being classified as insurance.250  The opinion is ambiguous on some
points, but clearly a CDS issued to a speculator who does not own the
CDS’s reference obligations would never treated as insurance under
the NYSID’s opinion.251  Also derivable from the opinion is that a
CDS, the payout of which is dependent on the purchaser’s loss, may be
classified as an insurance contract.252
The NYSID promised to clarify its position on CDSs in a Circular
Letter made available on September 22, 2008.253  The NYSID ex-
pressed its intention to explain whether “a CDS is an insurance con-
tract when it is purchased by a party who, at the time at which the
246. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911) (life insurance); Studio Frames Ltd. v.
Standard Fire Ins., 483 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 2007) (fire insurance); see also Bloink,
supra note 236 (discussing both life and property insurance).
247. See ABRAHAM, supra note 232, at 7.
248. See id.; see also Bloink, supra note 236 (discussing countervailing forces). See
generally Ben Kingree & Louise Tanner, Life Insurance as Motive for Murder, 29
TORT & INS. L.J. 761 (1994) (discussing moral hazard with respect to life insur-
ance policies).
249. See Letter from Rochelle Katz, Office of Gen. Counsel of the N.Y. State Ins. Dep’t,






253. N.Y. STATE INS. DEP’T, CIRCULAR LETTER NO. 19 (Sept. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/circltr/2008/cl08_19.pdf.
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agreement is entered into, holds, or reasonably expects to hold, a ‘ma-
terial interest’ in the referenced obligation.”254  In other words, the
NYSID was grappling with the question of whether a CDS is an insur-
ance contract when it is issued to a party with an insurable interest in
the reference obligations.
Classification of CDSs as insurance faced stiff resistance from de-
rivative market trade groups.  A joint letter written by the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and the Inter-
national Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) clearly states
what they view as the fundamental distinctions between CDSs and
insurance:
 There are a number of characteristics that distinguish the two.  Whereas
insurance requires an insurable interest, credit default swaps are often pur-
chased by protection buyers that are not hedging a specific underlying risk.
Insurance contracts generally are purchased and held by the buyer, whereas
CDS are frequently bought and sold.  And finally, insurance contracts only
pay out when the insured party actually incurs a loss.  CDS provide for pay-
ments to protection buyers upon the occurrence of a credit event, which fre-
quently occurs before any loss is incurred.  We believe each of these factors
marks a significant difference between CDS and insurance.255
Under pressure, the NYSID retreated from its prior willingness to
regulate CDSs as insurance, issuing a November 20, 2008, supple-
ment to its previous circular: “In light of [the] progress made toward
comprehensive federal regulation of CDS, New York will delay indefi-
nitely its application of New York Insurance Law to CDS[s].”256  Ef-
forts to incorporate these insurance regulatory concepts, and
specifically an insurable interest requirement, failed to gain inclusion
in the Act signed into law by president Obama in August 2010.257
D. Insurable Interest Requirement Would Stop Market
Manipulation by Speculators in CDSs
It is unsurprising that the insurable interest requirement has fre-
quently been mentioned in the CDS context.258  CDSs are often re-
254. Id. at 7.
255. Letter from Cory Strupp, Managing Dir. of the Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkt. Ass’n,
and Katherine Darras, Gen. Counsel, Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, Inc., to
Joseph Morelle, Chairman of the Task Force on Credit Default Swaps Regulation,
Nat’l Conference of Ins. Legislators (May 22, 2009), available at http://www.isda.
org/speeches/pdf/NCOIL-Letter.pdf.
256. N.Y. STATE INS. DEP’T, FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO CIRCULAR LETTER NO. 19 (Nov. 20,
2008), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/circltr/2008/cl08_19s1.htm.
257. See Ronald D. Orol, Senators Reject Effort to End Debate on Bank Bill,
MARKETWATCH (May 19, 2010, 5:39 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
rejection-of-democrat-measures-may-slow-bank-bill-2010-05-19 (discussing the
Senate’s rejection of Senator Dorgan’s amendment, which would have imposed an
insurable interest requirement under the Act).
258. See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Banks Bet Greece Defaults on Debt
They Helped Hide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/
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ferred to as a “type of insurance,”259 and a primary source of public
discomfort over CDSs is the fact that speculators—like the life insur-
ance speculators of eighteenth century London—are essentially “in-
suring” assets that they do not own. Investors who purchase CDS
protection without owning the associated credit instrument have an
incentive to manipulate the market to force the credit event that will
trigger payout on the CDS.
Imposing an insurable interest requirement on CDSs—requiring
protection purchasers to have economic exposure to the associated
credit instrument—would eliminate any market manipulation or dis-
tortion resulting from CDSs.  A person who owns or otherwise has an
economic interest in debt of the CDS’s reference entity is generally
disincentivised from encouraging or forcing the reference entity’s de-
fault, since any payout from the CDS will be offset by the purchaser’s
losses on the reference entity’s debt.260  While a blanket prohibition
on uncovered CDSs would eliminate the potential for market manipu-
lation or distortion, the proposition of imposing an insurable interest
requirement on CDSs is not without its downsides.261  The remainder
of this Article will examine the limitations involved in the comparison
of a CDS to fire insurance and the impact of an insurable interest re-
quirement on the CDS and broader credit markets.
VII. NAKED SHORT SELLING AND UNCOVERED
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
The policy of allowing a market in uncovered CDSs—sometimes
referred to in the media as “naked” CDSs—is often criticized in the
same breath as condemnation of naked short selling.262  In testimony
delivered to the Senate Banking Committee in 2008, Christopher Cox,
Chairman of the SEC, went so far as to equate the purchasing of CDS
protection without ownership of the reference obligation to naked
short selling the debt:
Economically, a CDS buyer is tantamount to a short seller of the bond under-
lying the CDS.  Whereas a person who owns a bond profits when its issuer is
in a position to repay the bond, a short seller profits when, among other
25/business/global/25swaps.html (“It’s like buying fire insurance on your neigh-
bor’s house—you create an incentive to burn down the house.”).
259. E.g., Jana Randow & Francine Lacqua, Trichet Pushes for Transparency Around
Credit Default Swaps, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 19, 2010, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-19/trichet-pushes-for-transparency-
around-credit-default-swaps.html.
260. See ABRAHAM, supra note 232, at 7 (explaining the insurable interest of “love and
affection” as a general disincentive to kill).
261. See discussion infra Part VIII (analyzing the social costs of a ban on uncovered
CDS positions).
262. See Germany, France Urge EU-Wide Ban on ‘Naked’ Short-Selling, supra note
216.
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things, the bond goes into default.  Importantly, CDS buyers do not have to
own the bond or other debt instrument upon which a CDS contract is based.
This means CDS buyers can “naked short” the debt of companies without re-
striction.  This potential for unfettered naked shorting and the lack of regula-
tion in this market are cause for great concern.263
The following section demonstrates that the purchase of an uncov-
ered CDS is not equivalent to naked short selling—which is in many
cases a socially undesirable activity without redeeming social value.
The transactions have little in common, differing in contractual struc-
ture and their capacity to be used as a tool to manipulate markets.
First, the concept of short-selling is introduced, distinguishing be-
tween a typical short sale and a naked short.  Next, U.S. regulation of
short selling is briefly discussed, with emphasis on regulation of na-
ked short selling.  Finally, naked short selling and uncovered CDSs
are distinguished.
A. Introduction to Short-Selling and Naked Short Selling
Short sales are made with the expectation that the price of the se-
curity sold short will decrease; it is essentially a bet against the value
of the security.264  Like a person purchasing protection in a CDS, a
short seller will gain on the transaction when the asset underlying the
transaction decreases in value.265  Both are essentially betting on, or
hedging against, the value of the underlying security decreasing: the
investor profits when the value of the security decreases.266  A person
who makes a short sale is said to take a “short position” in the secur-
ity.267  A person purchasing a security outright is said to take a “long
position” in the security.268
A short sale is conducted by borrowing, or arranging to borrow, a
security and then immediately selling the borrowed security on the
market.269  Then, if the value of the security decreases, the short
seller will purchase an identical security on the market for its de-
263. Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Spon-
sored Entities, Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008)
(statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts092
308cc.htm.
264. See TOM TAULLI, WHAT IS SHORT SELLING? 2–4 (2004).
265. See id. at 3–4.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 4.
268. See id. A person who short sells a particular security may also be referred to as
being “short” with respect to the security. See id.  In contrast, a “long position” is
taken when a party purchases a security outright. See id.
269. See id. at 3–4; see also 17 C.F.R. § 242.200(a) (2010) (defining “short sale” as “any
sale of a security which the seller does not own or any sale which is consummated
by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller”).  Short
selling is not exclusive to securities.  Commodities and other assets can be
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creased price and return that security to the securities lender.270  The
security that is sold in a short sale is typically borrowed from the
seller’s broker, who borrows the security from another of the broker’s
customers.271  The seller typically pays a lending fee to the broker.272
A short position is “closed” by the investor by “covering” the short posi-
tion; the short position is covered by purchasing securities on the mar-
ket to return to the lender.273
If the price of the security sold short has decreased in the interval
during which the investor was short, the investor will profit to the
extent of the difference between the beginning price and closing price,
less fees associated with the short sale.274  If the price of the security
increased over the interval during which the investor was short, the
investor will realize a loss to the extent of the difference between the
beginning price and the closing price, increased by fees associated
with the short sale.275
For example, investor A commences a short sale of stock ABC
when ABC is trading at $10 per share.  Investor A borrows stock ABC
and immediately resells it on the open market at $10.  The price of
ABC then drops to $5, and A covers by purchasing stock ABC on the
market and returning that stock to the lender.  If transactions fees are
$2.50 on the short sale, A will make a profit on the sale of $2.50.  How-
ever, if the price of ABC increases to $15 before A closes the short
position, A will realize a loss of $7.50 when A purchases ABC on the
market for $15 and transfers that stock to the lender.
Note that the price of a security can never decrease below $0.276
Thus, profit on a short sale is limited to the full price of the security at
the time the short seller makes the short sale.277  In contrast, the po-
tential loss on a short sale is essentially unlimited, since the price of a
security could theoretically continue to rise indefinitely, continuously
increasing the short seller’s losses.278  In reality, losses on a short sale
will be limited when the investor closes out the short position or is
unable to answer a margin call, and the short seller’s broker forcibly
closes the short position.279
shorted, but for the sake of simplicity, we will refer exclusively to short selling of
securities, including stocks and bonds.
270. See TAULLI, supra note 264, at 3–4.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 27–28.  Institutional investors typically do not pay interest costs unless
the stock is small or hard to borrow. Id. at 28.
273. See id. at 4.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id. at 29.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 30.
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Naked short sales.  A naked short sale is a short sale in which the
short seller does not borrow or arrange to borrow a security before
making a short sale.280  A short seller benefits from making a naked
short sale over making a covered short sale for the following reasons:
1. Reduced transactions costs—a naked short seller does not nec-
essarily borrow the shorted security and will not pay lending
fees.281
2. Enhanced liquidity and rapid response to market conditions—
when a security is difficult or impossible to locate for purchase,
naked short selling enhances liquidity by providing willing
purchasers with a source for purchase of the security.282
Fails to deliver. If the security sold in a naked short sale is not
purchased or borrowed by the short seller and delivered to the pur-
chaser by the settlement date, then the short seller has failed to de-
liver.283  Under U.S. securities law, the settlement date for securities
is the third day after the transaction date (referred to as “T+3”).284  A
“fail to deliver” will occur if a security is not delivered when due.285
B. U.S. Regulation of Naked Short Selling
In the press given to the German ban on short selling,286 very little
attention was paid to the fact that the U.S. essentially banned short
selling in 2005, adopting increasingly strict regulations since that
time.
The SEC has adopted a number of rules relating to short selling.
Regulation SHO, adopted by the SEC on July 28, 2004,287 includes
two primary components aimed at curbing short-selling: (1) a require-
ment that broker-dealers “locate securities available for borrowing”
before accepting a short sale order or making a short sale on its own
account,288 and (2) a requirement that all fails-to-deliver be closed out
“no later than the beginning of regular trading hours on the settle-
ment day following the day the participant incurred the fail to deliver
280. See Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 50013, 69 Fed. Reg. 48008, 48009 n.10
(Aug. 6, 2004).
281. See Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 60388, 74 Fed.
Reg. 38266, 38267 (July 31, 2009).
282. The liquidity boost provided by naked short selling was recognized by the SEC in
its original Regulation SHO, which included an exception to the Regulation’s lo-
cate requirement. See Short Sales, 69 Fed. Reg. at 48009 n.6.
283. See Amendments to Regulation SHO, 74 Fed. Reg. at 38266 n.2.
284. See id. at 38267 n.16.
285. See id. at 38266 n.2.
286. See discussion supra Part V.
287. See Short Sales, 69 Fed. Reg. at 48030–31.
288. See 17 C.F.R. 242.203 (2010); see also Short Sales, 69 Fed. Reg. at 48009 (provid-
ing a detailed description of Regulation SHO).
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position.”289  Broker-dealers are required to close out short positions
after fails-to-deliver and may be restricted from further short selling
until the positions are closed.290
Any naked short selling transaction will violate Regulation SHO,
since, by definition, a naked short sale is a short sale made without
borrowing or locating a security to borrow.291  The location require-
ment ensures that a naked short seller does not simply locate a secur-
ity to borrow and then fail to borrow it.  Violation of SHO can result in
penalties for brokers involved in the sale, including fines and restric-
tions on future short selling activities.292
C. Distinctions Between Naked Short Selling and
Uncovered CDSs
The U.S. prohibits naked short selling, so why not prohibit other
uncovered transactions, like uncovered CDSs?  Both types of transac-
tions permit a speculator to take an essentially unlimited short posi-
tion in a security without the expense of borrowing the security and
without any limits imposed by liquidity and volume.  Despite this ap-
parent similarity, important distinctions exist between naked short
sales and CDSs.
The first distinction between short selling and uncovered CDSs is
the structure of the transaction.  A short selling transaction involves
the lending and sale of a particular security, and a naked short sale is
an imperfect short sale where a lender has not been secured and the
security is not delivered to the buyer as per the terms of the sale.293
In contrast, a CDS is a derivative transaction that does not involve the
sale and delivery of a security.294  The reference obligation is only in-
dexed by the CDS contract as a touchstone for whether a payout will
be made to the buyer.295  The protection buyer and seller are in privity
with each other, and the contract can be completely performed with-
out the necessity of a third party’s involvement.296
Further, the “naked” component of a naked short sale refers to the
seller failing to hold up his end of a sales contract.  In U.S. securities
289. 17 C.F.R. 242.204 (2010); see also Amendments to Regulation SHO, 74 Fed. Reg.
at 38266 (explaining that a participant who has failed to deliver must immedi-
ately purchase or borrow securities to close out the fail to deliver within the des-
ignated time).
290. See Amendments to Regulation SHO, 74 Fed. Reg. at 38266.
291. See TAULLI, supra note 264, at 3.
292. See Amendments to Regulation SHO, 74 Fed. Reg. at 38266.
293. See id. at 38266 n.2.
294. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 31, at 5 (“Credit derivative instruments enable par-
ticipants in the financial market to trade in credit as an asset, as they isolate and
transfer credit risk.”).
295. See id. at 8–10.
296. See id.
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sales, the seller is required to make delivery to the buyer within three
days of the trade date.297  A naked short is “the sale of a security that
the seller does not own or any sale that is consummated by the deliv-
ery of a security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller.”298  The
purchaser has not agreed to participate in a naked short sale, which
essentially converts a security into an undated futures contract with-
out the other party’s assent.299  The counterparty may have priced the
transaction differently or refused to enter the transaction if the
seller’s intent had been made known at its inception.300
In contrast to a naked short sale, an uncovered CDS is a contract
between two sophisticated parties who are each aware of the risks and
benefits of the transaction.301  Each has had an opportunity to con-
duct due diligence in light of the counterparty risks inherent in a CDS.
While there may be a differential between the counterparties’ sophis-
tication and information in a CDS transaction, that information im-
balance is not inherent in the structure of the transaction, as it is in
the case of naked short selling.
In addition to structural differences between naked short sales and
uncovered CDSs, the transactions also differ in their effects on the
market.  Naked short sales have a direct effect on the price of the se-
curity involved in the transaction.302  In a naked short sale, the liquid-
ity and trading volume of the security being shorted is artificially
inflated.303  The seller is selling a security that he does not own, thus
effectively creating a “phantom share.”304  In fact, the number of fails-
to-deliver may be larger than the total public float in thinly capital-
ized companies.305  In contrast, a CDS is not a transaction in the ref-
erence security at all, and it does not have a direct effect on the
reference security’s spot price.306  CDSs do provide valuable informa-
297. See Amendments to Regulation SHO, 74 Fed. Reg. at 38267 n.16.
298. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 56212, 72 Fed. Reg.
45544, 45544 n.1 (Aug. 14, 2007).
299. Id. at 45544.
300. See id.
301. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 31, at 6–10 (discussing the structure of unfunded
credit derivatives, such as credit default swaps).
302. See Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 48709, 68 Fed. Reg. 62972, 62975
(Nov. 6, 2003) (“[N]aked short sellers enjoy greater leverage than if they were
required to borrow securities and deliver within a reasonable time period, and
they may use this additional leverage to engage in trading practices that deliber-
ately depress the price of a security.”).
303. See id.
304. See Edward E. Kaufman & Johnny Isakson, Op-Ed., To Restore Trust in Market,
Stop Abusive Short Selling, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 5, 2009, http://www.ajc.com/
opinion/content/opinion/stories/2009/05/05/isaksoned_0505.html.
305. See Short Sales, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62975.
306. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 31, at 9–10 (“The original buyer of the default swap
need never have owned a bond issued by the reference asset obligor.”).
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tion to the bond market, but they only indirectly affect the spot price
of the reference assets.
Additionally, although uncovered CDSs offer leverage to both pro-
tection purchasers and sellers, naked short selling offers (theoreti-
cally) unlimited leverage, since the seller does not buy or borrow the
security.307  Further, amplifying the manipulative potential of naked
short selling is the fact that naked short sellers “may use this addi-
tional leverage to engage in trading activities that deliberately de-
press the price of a security.”308
The direct effect of a naked short sale on the market in an underly-
ing security by artificially increasing liquidity in a downward direc-
tion provides ample opportunity for market manipulation.  In a very
typical naked short manipulation case, the SEC brought enforcement
action against individuals involved in a manipulative naked short sell-
ing scheme.309  In that case, the defendants held convertible bonds in
Sedona, a NASDAQ Small Cap company.310  At the bondholder’s op-
tion, the bonds were convertible into Sedona common stock.311  The
conversion rate was calculated at a discount to the market price of the
stock, so the lower the price of the company’s stock, the greater the
number of shares the defendant would receive in the conversion.312
The SEC alleged that the defendants engaged in “massive naked short
selling” of Sedona stock in order to flood the market with the stock,
decreasing its price and increasing the number of shares the defend-
ants received in the conversion.313
Unlike naked short selling, CDSs cannot artificially inflate the li-
quidity of reference assets; trading in CDSs can only directly impact
the market in CDSs.  While an investor who pushes spreads higher on
CDSs can distort the market for the underlying debt by decreasing
investors’ trust in the reference entity and increasing debt premiums,
such distortion can be counteracted to some extent by transparency
measure like those imposed by the Act.
Naked short selling provides the market with some benefits, such
as increasing the liquidity of hard-to-locate over-the-counter stocks.314
307. See MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22099, REGULATION OF NAKED
SHORT SELLING (2005), available at http://opencrs.com/document/RS22099/2005-
03-30/download/1013/.
308. Short Sales, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62975.
309. See Rhino Advisors, Inc. & Thomas Badian, Litigation Release No. 18003, 79 SEC
Docket 2079 (Feb. 27, 2003).
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. Short Sales, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62975 n.31.
313. See id.; Rhino Advisors, Inc. & Thomas Badian, Litigation Release No. 18003, 79
SEC Docket 2079.
314. See, e.g., Michael Mackenzie, SEC’s New Short Selling Rules ‘Threaten Liquidity,’
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9c6ca430-262a-11df-aff3-
00144feabdc0,s01=1.html (“Short sales are also undertaken by investors hedging
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However, because of naked short selling’s high potential for manipula-
tion and its unfairness to counterparties, the ban on naked short sell-
ing is probably, on balance, conducive to well-ordered markets.  In
contrast, although imposition of an insurable interest requirement on
CDSs would conceivably limit the potential for market distortion
originated in the CDS markets, that benefit is unlikely to outweigh
the social and market benefits of trading in uncovered CDSs.  Those
benefits are considered in the next section in the context of a discus-
sion of the moral hazards and social utility of CDSs as compared to
those of insurance policies.
VIII. WHY THE ANALOGY BETWEEN FIRE INSURANCE AND
UNCOVERED CDSs FAILS
A. Differences Between Hedging and Insurance
There is a relatively straightforward standard that dictates who is
permitted to purchase traditional life or property insurance covering a
particular risk—the insurable interest requirement.  A person with-
out an insurable interest does not, by definition, have an economic in-
terest in the subject of a policy.315  As illustrated in the classic
example, a person does not have an economic interest in his neighbor’s
house; his neighbor’s house burning to the ground will not directly af-
fect him in an economic sense.316  The insurable interest requirement
provides a simple test for determining whether a person is at risk in
the insurance context.  Determination of whether a protection pur-
chaser has an economic interest in a reference obligation is far more
complex.  There is no such straight-line demarcation between parties
who have an economic interest in a reference entity or its obligations.
To require that every person who purchases CDS protection own the
CDS’s reference obligations would exclude investors who purchase
protection for hedging purposes but who do not own the reference
obligations.317
positions and are used by market makers to keep liquidity flowing across
markets.”).
315. See, e.g., Banks McDowell, Insurable Interest in Property Revisited, 17 CAP. U. L.
REV. 165, 171 (1988) (“Insurable interest defines a minimum kind of connection
which the purchaser of insurance must have with the subject of the risk in order
for the transaction to be valid.”).
316. See, e.g., MILES MENANDER DAWSON, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LEGISLATION 3
(New York, Humboldt Library 1895).  However, the value of his house may de-
crease if his neighbor’s burned house is not rebuilt.
317. See Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default
Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
167, 189 (2007); see also M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives are not “Insur-
ance,” 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 32 (2009) (“If (insurance) regulation is limited to cases
where there is an insurable interest, the contract is not one of simple hedging,
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In the simplest case, a CDS is purchased to hedge against a specific
risk in an investor’s or institution’s portfolio.318  A hedge fund may,
for instance, own $100 million in Corporation A’s bonds.  That risk can
be hedged by purchasing CDS protection with a notional amount of
$100 million.  In that case, the insurable interest requirement (as ap-
plied to CDSs) would be satisfied.  However, this oversimplified case
does not represent many hedging transactions.319  As an example, a
U.S. firm may have U.K. interest rate exposure flowing from non-sov-
ereign debt denominated in U.K. pounds and may choose to hedge that
interest rate risk by purchasing a CDS on U.K. sovereign debt, even
though the firm does not directly hold U.K. sovereign debt.  Although
many hedging transactions involving the purchase of a CDS would
satisfy the insurable interest requirement, some legitimate hedging
transactions would not.  As a result, application of the insurable inter-
est requirement to credit derivatives would artificially limit hedging
opportunities.
B. Distinctions Between Moral Hazards Present in Fire
Insurance and Uncovered CDS Positions
The discussion of the application of the insurable interest require-
ment to CDSs in Part IV concluded that the requirement would reduce
or eliminate the manipulative potential of CDSs.  Yet, insurance and
CDSs present different risk-benefit profiles, and application of insur-
ance concepts to credit derivatives may do more harm than good for
the markets and society in general.
The analogy between fire insurance and CDSs first breaks when
we compare the respective moral hazards presented by the two.  As
discussed in Part VI, insurance introduces a moral hazard by encour-
aging, or at least reducing discouraging side effects of, destructive be-
havior.320  Thus, for instance, when a person insures his house
against fire damage, he may be more careless when cooking in his
house because the economic cost of carelessness has been reduced by
the insurance policy.321  This moral hazard is accordingly thought to
increase the probability that an adverse event will occur.322
The moral hazard introduced by insurance is greater when the
party purchasing an insurance policy has no financial interest in the
arbitrage, or speculation, and there is risk pooling, then this class of cases is like
an empty set.”).
318. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 31, at 2 (“Credit derivatives may be used to manage
risk exposure inherent in a corporate or non-AAA sovereign bond portfolio . . . .”).
319. See Henderson, supra note 317.
320. See discussion supra sections VI.A–B.
321. Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance As Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN.
INS. L.J. 11, 12 (1999).
322. Id. at 12 n.1.
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insured.323  The example of purchasing fire insurance on a neighbor’s
house is powerful in the CDS context, because anyone can understand
the risk to his house if a neighbor—or worse, an enemy—is allowed to
purchase insurance on it.  A neighbor who purchases a fire insurance
policy on the house of another has an economic incentive to see the
house burn and no counterbalancing incentive to see it survive.324  If
the house does not burn, the neighbor will be out the premiums paid
on the fire insurance policy.  However, if the house burns, the neigh-
bor will profit to the extent the policy payout is greater than premi-
ums paid on the policy.  Although there are disincentives to burning
the house down—criminal and civil liability—from a purely economic
standpoint, the neighbor will benefit if the house burns and may be
tempted to start a fire himself if desperate enough for the payout and
if he believes that his chance of getting caught by the authorities is
slim.
Moral hazard can also be thought of as information asymmetry,
where a person who has more information about a situation has an
incentive to act inappropriately from the perspective of the party who
will bear the economic consequences of the risk.325  The information
asymmetry in the fire insurance scenarios relates to the intentions of
the person who purchases fire insurance on his neighbor’s house.
Neither the homeowner nor the insurer know the intentions of the
purchaser:  Is he simply speculating, intending to hold the policy as a
gamble that his neighbor’s house will burn?  Or, does he intend to take
steps to burn his neighbor’s house down, thus accelerating his return
on the policy?  Although an insurer can mitigate or eliminate the
moral hazard in the fire insurance scenario by choosing not to issue
insurance to a person without an insurable interest in the property
insured or constructing a contract that will not pay if the purchaser
intentionally causes the risk to materialize, the homeowner is without
such power in this situation.  As a result, legislatures and courts have
seen fit to impose an insurable interest requirement on every
purchase of insurance to protect the public from strangers who would
purchase insurance policies with bad intentions.326
323. McDowell, supra note 315, at 173 (“In all cases where there is no insurable inter-
est, the moral hazard temptation is clearly present because the insured has no
interest to suffer a loss . . . .”).
324. Cf. ABRAHAM, supra note 232, at 7 (explaining that the owner of a life insurance
policy purchased on another’s life “had an incentive to cause the insured death to
occur”).
325. See generally Edward Goldstein, Moral Hazard, Hurricanes, and Climate
Change, 14 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 17 (2009) (“[A]symmetry comes about when the
person taking the risk . . . has sufficient information about the risk they are tak-
ing, perhaps more than the party paying for the potential negative consequences
of the risk . . . .”).
326. See CAL. INS. CODE § 281 (West 2010); Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 778–79
(1881).
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The moral hazard presented by CDSs presents a different danger
than fire insurance and requires a different regulatory response, be-
cause the manipulative power of a protection purchaser is far greater
in fire insurance than CDSs.  By following through on a simple set of
steps, a person can burn down his neighbor’s house with near 100%
efficacy: he need only walk out his front door, pour a sufficient quan-
tity of gasoline on his neighbor’s house, and light a match.  Manipula-
tion of a sovereign’s or corporation’s creditworthiness or capacity to
satisfy its debts is a far more complex task requiring capital possessed
by only a few, if any, of the world’s largest money center banks.
First, information asymmetries in the CDS market are buffered by
other market participants; there is no such balance in the case of in-
surance.  As is the case when a person purchases fire insurance on his
neighbor’s house, the information asymmetry in the purchase of CDS
protection involves the intentions of the party purchasing protection.
The purchaser may simply be a speculator who believes the
creditworthiness of the reference entity is suspect.  Or, the purchaser
may be purchasing protection as a hedge.  Or, the purchaser may have
nefarious purposes, intending to manipulate the creditworthiness of
the reference entity in order to profit from a secondary sale of the CDS
or from a payout triggered by a credit event.  Where the information
asymmetry differs between insurance and credit derivatives is in the
scope of forces balancing the asymmetry.  While the insurer may have
access to superior information about the purchaser’s intentions, the
insurer is only a single competing source of information.  Thousands of
counterparties in the CDS and bond markets participate in countless
trades, each of which provides the market with different information
about reference entities and obligations.  Thus, while the market may
be unaware that a substantial CDS trade was made for manipulative
purposes, most such trades would be ineffective because competing,
contradictory information will balance the information asymmetry.
These competing sources of information balance information asym-
metries in the CDS market, which only secondarily affects the bond
markets.  Purchase of CDS protection cannot directly affect yields on a
reference entity’s debt.  Only the largest financial players would have
the wherewithal to manipulate the bond market through CDS trades.
Because the moral hazard presented by uncovered CDSs is signifi-
cantly reduced from that of stranger purchased insurance policies, the
insurable interest requirement is the proverbial sledge hammer to the
fly representing uncovered credit default swaps.  While credit default
swaps may precipitate crisis, such as the collapse of AIG, it is not be-
cause they present a significant moral hazard.
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C. CDSs: Information and Price Discovery
CDSs, covered and uncovered, serve an important social purpose
by providing the market—and the public in general—with valuable
information about the corporations and governments that are the
CDSs’ reference entities.327  A number of empirical studies have
demonstrated that price discovery in the CDS markets is superior to
that in the bond markets, with the CDS markets “leading” other mar-
kets.328  The “CDS market plays a more important price discovery role
than the bond market.”329
This informational role may be enhanced, in part, because the
credit markets provide the public market a glimpse of the banks’ infor-
mation about their customers on whom credit derivatives are being
bought and sold.330  CDS markets may be “transmitting non-public
information into publicly traded securities such as stocks,” thus mov-
ing private information in the CDS markets into the public markets,
increasing information flow in the public markets.331  Concerns are
thus raised about insider trading, because, at least in the equity mar-
kets, there is good evidence that insider trading and other informa-
tional asymmetries may harm market liquidity.332  Indeed, the
prevalence of insider trading in CDS may be more acute because
many, or most, of the major players in the credit derivatives markets
are insiders.333  Yet, although insider trading is taking place in the
CDS markets, it is unlikely that such trading negatively affects liquid-
ity or prices in the market.334  One study found that insider trading
may be actually increasing liquidity in the CDS markets.335
Obviously any blatant attempt at market manipulation carried out
using CDSs or short selling does not improve information about an
entity or its debt.  However, such attempts at manipulation are be-
coming increasing more difficult as liquidity in a given market in-
creases and the associated increase in market pricing information is
327. See GERALD P. DWYER & THOMAS FLAVIN, CTR. FOR FINANCIAL INNOVATION & STA-
BILITY, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS ON GOVERNMENT
DEBT: MINDLESS SPECULATION? (2010), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/
documents/cenfis/pubscf/nftv_0910.pdf (demonstrating that CDS “spreads reflect
fundamental developments, not mindless speculation,” using data from Ireland’s
recent sovereign debt crisis).
328. See Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit Deriva-
tives, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 110 (2007); Lars Norden & Martin Weber, The Co-Move-
ment of Credit Default Swap, Bond and Stock Markets: An Empirical Analysis, 15
EURO. FIN. MGMT. 529 (2009).
329. See Acharya & Johnson, supra note 328, at 114.
330. See id. at 113.
331. See id.
332. Id. at 112–13.
333. See id. at 111.
334. See id. at 138.
335. Id. at 138.
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made available by diverse market participants.  Ironically, a result of
broad based restrictions on short selling and CDSs is that the public’s
information about the health of its foundational entities—corpora-
tions and governments—will be compromised by regulation that re-
duce the number of market participants, which in turn increases the
likelihood of future bubbles.
Even if CDSs do speed collapse by applying downward pressure to
reference obligations, such effect may simply be the result of a more
accurate credit profile being painted of reference entities.  As painful
as the pinch may be if CDS activity increases yields on a reference
entity’s debt, this pain may serve as a legitimate warning, signaling
trouble and hopefully forcing a response that addresses the problems
underlying the pain.  Moreover, even if CDSs (and short selling activ-
ity) hasten an inevitable downturn, bringing to light credit difficulties
of the underlying reference debt issuer more quickly than would have
otherwise occurred, they may reduce the aggregate downturn by get-
ting an entity back on track sooner than it would have been if inevita-
ble failure had been delayed.336
D. Policy Choice
Regulators tackling credit default swaps have a clear policy choice
to make.  They can choose to believe that the CDS market wags the
tail of the underlying spot market for reference debt, necessitating
strict restrictions—such as the insurable interest requirement—on
uncovered transactions.  Under that view, big market players like
Goldman Sachs are all-powerful, playing the same game as the penny
stock manipulators who use naked short selling to drive down the
price of stocks.  Imposition of an insurable interest requirement is nec-
essary to curtail speculation in CDSs, and the associated costs—such
as decreased liquidity and increased cost-of-debt all around—are out-
weighed by the benefits of regulating CDSs like insurance.
Regulators can choose instead to recognize that a more nuanced
approach is necessitated by the social value provided by CDSs and the
detachment of the CDS market from the bond markets.  While the in-
surable interest requirement is an easy solution to the perceived po-
tential for market manipulations or distortion by means of CDSs, the
fire insurance analogy is flawed, because allowing a person to
purchase fire insurance on his neighbor’s house carries all the risk
generated by a significant moral hazard and none of the social benefits
of uncovered CDSs.  In contrast to insurance contracts issued without
an insurable interest, uncovered CDSs precipitate a greatly reduced
336. See Philipp Bagus, The Social Function of Credit-Default Swaps, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (June 29, 2010), http://www.ibtimes.com/contents /20100629 /social-
function-credit-default-swaps.htm.
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moral hazard and offer the marketplace and society in general a num-
ber of benefits.  Uncovered CDSs, for example, contribute a wealth of
information to the bond market, enhancing the price discovery process
for their reference obligations.  In contrast to other market activi-
ties—like naked short selling—CDSs, as derivatives, do not allow di-
rect manipulation of their reference obligations.  The effect of CDSs on
the bond market is indirect, making manipulation of the spot market
through CDSs far less likely.  Naked short-selling is a far more effec-
tive market manipulation tool than CDSs, offering greater leverage
and direct access to the market being manipulated.  While insurance
and short selling both have attributes which make them appealing
analogues to CDSs, these analogies break down under a more focused
analysis.
IX. CONCLUSION
The efficacy of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act’s reliance on imposed transparency in the CDS markets
must be compared with that of current European proposals and New
York’s prior effort to impose varying degrees of market restrictions on
trading in “naked CDSs” as a regulatory tool to curb perceived abuses.
If the newly enacted Dodd–Frank legislation is successful in bringing
CDS trading out of the shadows, the ensuing enhanced market infor-
mation should expose any outright attempts at market manipulation.
Further, if we look to markets to efficiently determine price or lending
rates, the U.S. paradigm of increasing access to information about
CDS trades and market participants should prevail over attempts to
curtail certain types of market activity.  The imperfect fit of the insur-
able interest requirement to CDS markets should cause concern in
light of its limiting constraints on the price discovery function of the
market.  Requiring market participants to have an interest in the un-
derlying debt will shrink the CDS markets and cause them to price
credit risk less efficiently.
The best measure of the contrasting regulatory frameworks will be
the degree to which they bar the CDS market from distorting prices in
the underlying reference debt.  Ultimately it will be left to economists
to quantify and measure the degree to which the CDS markets led to
or accelerated the implosion of AIG or the market’s turn against
Greek debt.  Absent overwhelming empirical evidence pointing to the
CDS markets as the causal determinant of such market implosions,
we must hesitate before unduly restricting CDS markets based prima-
rily on popular displeasure with resulting credit markets.  The final
test of whether market transparency alone can effectively regulate
CDS markets will be how much higher the cost of borrowing is be-
tween markets that do and do not require an insurable interest in the
underlying debt. 
